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: Humanitarian Intervention and Syria

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SYRIA
Dr. Jur.Eric Engle, LL.M *
"Nations, being obliged by nature reciprocally to cultivate human society
(Prelim. § 11), are bound to observe towards each other all the duties which the
safety and advantage of that society require."
-Emmerich de Vattel'
INTRODUCTION

Syria is currently undergoing deep civil turmoil; indeed, some would say a
revolution. This crisis, a real turning point 2 in Syria and world affairs, may well
turn into a defining moment for relations between Russia and the United States.
The Syrian government is, at the very least, a de facto ally3 of the Russian
Federation (R.F).4 However, the United States regards Syria's head of state, Bashar
al-Assad, as a violator of fundamental human rights and wishes to see him removed
from power.' Syria reiterates, twenty-five years later, much of the Cold War logic. 6
*
Dr. Engle teaches law at Humboldt University, Berlin. He has taught law in France, Germany, Estonia,
and Russia. He has studied law in the U.S. (JD), France (DEA, DEA) and Germany (L.L.M., Dr. Jur.). qI-1acmb
moi Cwlbl, qmo eeo xoiem 3,7a u 6e'HO coepulaem 6naeo-Bulgakov ("I am part of that power which ever
wills to do ill and ever works to do well" Bulgakov, Master and Margarita(author's translation)). I wish to
thank my editors at the Barry Law Review for their pains-taking work.
I.
THE LAW OF NATIONS: BOOK II, § I para. 4 (1883).
See Crisis, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, available at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?
2.
term=crisis (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) The ancient Greek word crisis (Kpioug) means "turning point" and was used
by Hippocrates to refer to disease-either the patient dies or gets well.
3.

GEORGE GINSBURGS & ROBERT SLUSSER, A CALENDAR OF SOVIET TREATIES 1958-1973 at 674 (1981)

(noting the agreement on Soviet use of naval facilities in exchange for delivery of advanced air defense missiles
and jet fighter planes).
The Russian led Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) had been considering entering into a free
4.
trade agreement with Syria. TamoaceHHblIl COIO3 H CHpHH Mory-r nOfmcaTb AoroBop o co3AaHHH 301H
CBo60HbIA ToproBJn [Customs Union and Syria Can Sign an Agreement on Free Trade Zone], 10 TELEVISION

RusSIA (May 28, 2012), http://www.tvl00.ru/news/tamojennyy-soyuz-i-siriya-mogut-podpisat-dogovor-osozdanii-zony-svobodnyy-torgovli-56782/. However, that is probably no longer the case. Although Russia had
been regularly selling arms to Syria that is no longer the case. La Russie vend 36 Yak-130 h la Syrie [Russia Sells
36 Yak-130 to Syria], INFO-AVIATION (Jan. 27, 2012), http://info-aviation.com/?p=12954 27 janvier 2012; La
Russie Ne Conclura Pas De Nouveaux Contrats De Vente D'armes A vec La Syrie [Russia Will Not Enter into New
Contracts for
Arms
Sales
to
Syria],
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL
(July
9,
2012),
Russland
http://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/moyen-orient-afrique-du-nord/syrie/docs/2012/russie-stop-armes-syrie;
stellt Lieferung von Kampfflugzeugen an Assad ein [Russia Represents a Supply of FighterAircraft to Assad],
SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (July 9, 2012), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/gewalt-in-syrien-russland-stelltlieferung-von-kampfflugzeugen-an-assad-ein-1.1406550.
Putin states his strategy is to try to force both sides to the negotiating table. Russland liefert Syrien keine Waffen
mehr [Russia Supplies Syria Any Weapons], 20 MINUTEN ONLINE (July 9, 2012, 2:38 PM),
http://www.20min.ch/ausland/news/story/26129790.
See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks at the Friends of the Syrian People MinisterialMeeting,
5.
DEPT. OF STATE (July 6, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rmi/2012/07/194628.htm ("We are
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Syria's case presents a possibility for further elaboration of the international rule of
law. Instead, for political reasons, it is more likely that it will represent a downward
spiral into violent lawlessness, a failure of the post cold-war international system.7
Syria may even be the unfortunate harbinger of a "cold peace". It does not need to
be so.
This article first examines the political situation regarding Syria so that the
legal commentary that follows will be understood in context of its practical realworld connection. Part I will examine the actors, their interests, and possible
outcomes. Part I will explore the relevant international law.9
I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. The Strategic Stakes
1. Russia
"[T]he West, in painting [the Free Syrian Army] as freedom fighters, doesn't
understand that these guys, are blood-sucking vampires and if they come to power
there will be hell to pay, and for the Americans, too."
-Maxim Yusinto
During the Cold War, the USSR was a global power, claiming the capacity to
lead a global struggle of the impoverished "East" (the second world) and "South"
(the third world) against the industrialized, imperialist, and developed "North" (the
first world). The USSR presented an alternative model to liberalism: a socialist
people's dictatorship, led by an intellectual vanguard party implementing a planned
economy claiming to act on behalf of ordinary workers to protect them from
exploitation by capitalists. The defeat of the USSR in the Cold War resulted from
the successful U.S. policy of seeking to bankrupt the USSR by way of an arms
race, which turned U.S. technological superiority to a strategic advantage,
punctuated by bullet-points, such as the funding of anti-Soviet insurgencies in
Afghanistan, Nicaragua" and probably Eritrea (inter alia). The Strategic Defense
united in support of the Syrian people and in our absolute resolve to see the end of the Assad regime and a
transition to a democratically-elected, representative government.").
6.
Russia's Cold-War Strategy for Syria, LE FIGARO (Feb. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.eurotopics.net/en/home/presseschau/archiv/article/ARTICLE100165-Russia-s-Cold-War-strategy-forSyria; see also Peter McKay, Syria's Dead are Victims of the New Cold War, MAILONLINE (June 10, 2012),
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2157318/Syrias-dead-victims-new-Cold-War.html.
7.
"The reported mass killings are likely to ignite more anger nearly two weeks after the massacre of more
than 100 people elsewhere in Syria as an international peace plan unravels and the country spirals toward civil
war." Associated Press, Syrian Activists Say Dozens Killed in Hama Province, CBCNEWS (June 6, 2012 6:36 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/06/06/syria-hama-violence.html.
8.
See infra Part 1.
9.
See infra Part II.
10.
Julia loffe, In Russia, Even Putin's Critics Are OK with His Syria Policy, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 23,
2012, 7:20 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/105281/in-russia-even-putins-critics-are-ok-his-syria-policy.
Maxim Yemin is the Deputy Editor of the foreign affairs section of the daily newspaper Kommersant. Id.
11.

wOLFF HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, CASEBOOK VOLKERRECHT § 399, at 179 (Beck, 2005).
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Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars") sought to create a missile shield against the USSR. 12
The SDI certainly violated the spirit of the since abrogated Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty and probably the letter of the treaty as well.13 The SDI-much like
the secret wars-was a "black" project. It is impossible to say for certain whether,
and to what extent, it in fact violated the ABM Treaty at least until documents
become de-classified.
The stick of Reagan's arms race was matched with a carrot: a promise of
economic restructuring and development of the USSR should they bring down the
Berlin Wall. 14 However, despite implied promises, there was no "Marshall Plan"' 5
or "bank for reconstruction and development" of the post-Soviet space.16 Rather
than restructure and rebuild the post-Soviet economy, the U.S. instead sought to
dismember the USSR into its constituent republics to permanently remove the
threat of nuclear war and global revolution the USSR presented. The U.S. at least
tolerated criminal tendencies of certain Russian classes" because much legitimate
economic activity was defined as economic crime by Soviet standards.' 8 All
Russian economic actors in the early 1990s were "criminals," at least according to
Soviet law and the nomenklatura. If the United States succeeded at permanently
removing the threat of a Soviet strategic nuclear strike and global third-world
revolutions by way of disaggregation of the post-Soviet Republics, whether
through ethnic nationalism, privatization, asset-stripping, or criminality
(fractionating and diffusing), the U.S. did not succeed at instilling the rule of law,
human rights, and democracy-not even in the core Slav republics (Russia,
Belarus, and the Ukraine). This is to say nothing of the even poorer post-Soviet
peripheral republics such as Georgia. The U.S. defeated its enemy, but has yet to
build an ally therefrom. It can and should but lacks vision and expertise thereto due
to linguistic and cultural isolation.
Against this background, the conflict in Syria is a reiteration of dysfunctional
Cold War interactions, which are suboptimal for the U.S. and the Russian
Federation-to say nothing of the Syrian people and their terrible fate, which is
currently in the balance.
12.

CATHAL J. NOLAN, THE GREENWOOD

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: S-Z 1600

(2002).
13.

See generally Donald G. Gross, Negotiated Treaty Amendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM Treaty

Conflict, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31 (1987).
14.
Peter Robinson, "Tear Down This Wall": How Top Advisers Opposed Reagan's Challenge to
no. 2, Summer 2007, at 2, available at
Gorbachev-But Lost, 39 PROLOGUE MAG.,
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2007/summer/berlin.html. Ronald Reagan famously said at the
Brandenburger Tor, Berlin: "General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr.
Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" Id.
No Marshall Plan for the Soviets Yet, CHI. TRIB. (May 26, 1991), available at
15.
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-05-26/news/9102160972_1-shatalin-soviet-economy-soviets-hope.
16.
See Craig R. Whitney, Gorbachev's Pleas for Aid Not Expected to Bear Fruit, N.Y. TIMES (May 24,
1991), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/24/world/gorbachev-s-pleas-for-aid-not-expected-to-bearfruit.html.
17.
See TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE 85 (Ryszard Stemplowski ed.
2002); Alfred McCoy, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN: CIA COMPLICITY IN THE GLOBAL DRUG TRADE 385 (2003).
See generally WILLIAM A. CLARK, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE SOVIET OFFICIALDOM:
18.
COMBATING CORRUPTION IN THE POLITICAL ELITE, 1965-1990 (1993).
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Russia's strategic interests in Syria, broadly speaking, are as follows:
1) Syria, i.e., Assad's government, has been a Russian ally since at least the
1960s.
2) Russia's only overseas naval base is at the port of Tartus in Syria.
3) Syria is a Russian market for arms exports.
4) Russia exports nuclear technology to Iran, a profitable enterprise. However,
Russia keeps tight control over the technical experts needed to actually use
such technology. That is, when Russia withdraws Russian technical experts
from Iran, Iran cannot then use or further its nuclear program. This Russian
policy of inculcating technical dependence is deliberate. 19 Russia seeks to
control Iran thereby, to guarantee the security of Russia from potential nuclear
terrorism, and as a method for obtaining further construction and sales
contracts.
5) Regarding the suppression of extremist Islamic terrorism, Russia has a
substantial Muslim minority. Some of them are violent extremists, who are
willing to undertake "martyrdom operations" in Russia (suicide bombings).
Iran is known as a sponsor of state terrorism. If Iran is playing with nuclear fire
Russia is also playing with fire. Whether Russia truly can or believes it can
moderate Iranian anti-semitic extremism and state-sponsored terrorism is
questionable.
6) The Russian Federation specifically condemns abuses of human rights in
Syria by any actor and especially the use of civilians as human shields.20
7) The Russian Federation, in my eyes unrealistically, seeks to reclaim its role
as a global power. Lacking an ideology to do so, and with a much diminished
population base due to the independence of its former Central Asian Republics,
Russia does not have the population base or productivity to rival countries like
the People's Republic of China or the United States or the E.U. Russia can
justifiably claim a proper role in Central Asia, but its limited cold war era
global alliance network has two decades later been essentially disrupted.
Russia's desire to maintain a base in Syria is pragmatic rather than ideological.
The Montreux Convention strictly governs the transit of military vessels through
the Bosphorous Straits-a waterway located entirely within Turkey's territory.2 1
Russia cannot rapidly deploy ships from its Black Sea fleet to the Mediterranean
because of that treaty. Moreover, Russia and Turkey have not historically been

19.
C16ment Therme, L'Entente stratigiquerusso-iranienne:une menace pour la sicuritd? [The RussianIranian Strategic Agreement: A Threat to Security?], IFRI.ORG, at 1, 8-9 (May 2006), available at
http://www.ifi.org/files/PMOM_2.pdf.
20.
Press Release, Situation with Evacuation of the Inhabitants of the Blockaded Quarters of the Syrian
City of Horns, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (July 4, 2012), available at

http://www.mid.rulbdomp/Brp_4.nsflarh/E243A5221 AAF87EA44257A36002DO643?OpenDocument.
21.
Montreux Convention, July 20, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 213. The official text of the treaty is French. An
unauthoritative English translation is available at http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Montreux ENG.pdf.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol18/iss1/5

4

: Humanitarian Intervention and Syria

133

Humanitarian Intervention and Syria

Fall 2012

allies-just the opposite.2 2 This author posits that the Russian government is
unwilling to withdraw from their Tartus base in Syria under any circumstances; I
expect that is a non-negotiable point to the Russian leadership. Thereto, it should
be mentioned, that Russia does have technicians and personnel stationed at the
Tartus base and elsewhere in Syria.23 While the base itself is small, it is also
necessary, at least in the eyes of the Russian military. In theory, the base could be
expanded.
Discussions regarding the Middle East naturally revolve around energy policy
and politics. Regarding energy, Russia is a powerhouse-roughly eighty percent of
all known deposits of natural gas on earth are found on Russian territory.2 4 To
complicate matters, much of that is found in regions with significant minority
Muslim populations (local majorities, but nationally minorities, for the next two
decades given population trends).25 Consequent to the separatist war in Chechnya,
led by Muslim separatists and fought over oil, 2 6 Russia and the U.S. have had a
common interest in the suppression of terrorism, specifically Jihadist terrorism.27
Russia is a major producer of oil and petroleum products, and an exporter of
28
nuclear power plant technology. Russia is resource rich, although the Russian
people are generally somewhat impoverished. 2 9 Like the other BRIC (Brazil,
Russia, India and China) countries, Russia is a powerful economy on the threshold
of becoming part of the first world. In fact, Moscow, a city of 20 million, is first
world-but Russia's rural hinterland is essentially a subsistence economy and even
a barter economy in some places. This poverty in its own periphery makes the
Russian struggle against terrorism all the more bitter. As Marx said, the people
with "nothing to lose but their chains" can dare anything-including suicide
bombings, from which Russia has also suffered.30
22.
Dmitri Trenin, Russia and Turkey: Enemies in the Past, Conscious Partners in the Future, EUINSIDE
(Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.euinside.eu/en/analyses/russia-and-turkey-enemies-in-the-past-partners-in-the-future.
23.
Frank Gardner, How Vital is Syria's Tartus Port to Russia?, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2012, 1:23 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18616191.
24.

Russia:

Country

Analysis

Brief, U.S.

ENERGY

INFORMATION

ADMINISTRATION

(EIA),

http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=RS (last updated Sept. 18, 2012) ("Russia holds the world's
largest natural gas reserves, the second largest coal reserves, and the eighth largest crude oil reserves. Russia was
the largest producer of crude oil in 2009, surpassing Saudi Arabia. Russia has the largest natural gas reserves in the
world and it is the second-largest producer of natural gas. Russia is one of the top producers and consumers of
electric power in the world, with more than 220 million kilowatts of installed generation capacity.").
25.
See, e.g., Dipak Basu, The Conflict of Chechnya: The Cause, IVARTA.COM (Sept. 13, 2004),
http://www.ivarta.com/columns/ol 040913.htm.
26.
E.g., Craig Pirrong, Russia's Chechen War: It All Comes Down to Energy Rents, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr.
4, 2010), available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/l96964-russia-s-chechen-war-it-all-comes-down-to-energyrents.
E.g., Simon Shuster, How the War on Terrorism Did Russia a Favor, TIME (Sept. 19, 2011), available
27.
at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2093529,00.html.
28.
See UAE, Russia Sign Nuclear Deal, FOX BUSINESS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com
/news/2012/12/17/uae-russia-sign-nuclear-deal/; see Russia: Country Analysis Brief supranote 24.
See generally Lincoln C. Chen, Friederike Wittgenstein, & Elizabeth McKeon, The Upsurge of
29.
Mortality of in Russia: Causes and Policy Implications, 22 POPULATION & DEv. REv., Sept. 1996, available at
http://www.jstor.org/discover/l 0.2307/2137719?uid=3739600&uid=2&uid-4&uid=3739256&sid=211015516371

0.
30.

KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Samuel Moore trans., Penguin

Books 1967) (1848).
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Trade and investment between Russia and the U.S. is virtually non-existent.31
In contrast, Russia trades intensively with the European Union (EU). 32 Russia is
relatively autarchic, but not absolutely. Happily, Russia has finally been admitted
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).33 The free movement of goods, capital,
workers, and services fosters peace by building mutual dependence and prosperity.
Russian accession to the WTO represents hope for a better future.
The 1990s were a decade of poverty and lawless criminality in Russia.
Obviously the Russian Federation wishes to grow into the first world and even to
reclaim its status as a leading light of the third world. Russian ambition to be a
global power, although currently unrealistic, is also understandable, given Russia's
history. By cooperating with China, it could indeed return to global power.
Moreover, if Russia and/or China can actualize a workable plan for the peaceful
and sustainable development of the impoverished third world then we should thank
them heartily for making our world a more peaceful and prosperous place.
Currently, however, neither Russia nor China has elaborated an ideology to
legitimize any claim they may wish to make as leaders of the global south. Nor
have they crafted a model for stable and sustainable third world economic
development. So, we are not facing neo-communism or anything like it. Indeed, the
Russian inability to extend the rule of law and human rights to its allies reflects a
certain rigidity and weakness of the concept of vertical powers and authoritarian
democracy as methods for the implementation or even formation of an ideology to
represent the claims of the global south.
Caesar Chavez or the Castro brothers possibly could, but have not, developed
an ideology of third world resistance to global capitalism. In that sense, the global
ideology of liberalism-market capitalism with individual rights 34 -will likely
continue to prevail globally, but only by default because liberalism has not
fashioned a workable universal model for sustainable development and peace in the
third world periphery. 35 However, presently there is no alternative ideology to
market liberalism presented by, or available to, the global south. Argentinean
President Cristina Kirchner's Peronism 36 is the only real alternative option to

31.

In 2011 U.S. exports to Russia were under ten billion dollars (8,286.1) and imports were just over 34

billion (34,619.0). Trade in Goods with Russia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2011), http://www.census.gov/foreign-

trade/balance/c4621.html.
32.
In 2010 the EU exported E86.1 billion to Russia and imported E158.6 billion from Russia. Russia Trade
Picture, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries
/russia/ (last updated Feb. 8, 2013).
33.

ERIc ENGLE, RUSSIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CIS 39-49 (2012).

34.
Anne-Marie Slaughter-Burley, InternationalLaw in a World of LiberalStates, 6 EuR. J. INT'L L. 503,
514 (1995) (imagining a world of peace democracy and human rights; hypothesizing a world of liberal states).
35.
Duncan Kennedy, African Poverty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 205, 233 (2012), available at
http://duncankennedy.net/documents/New/African%20Poverty.pdf; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Political
Aspect ofDevelopment Theory, VIMEO, available at http://vimeo.com/21727630 (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
36.
La Presidentapidid 'unidad, organizaci6ny solidaridad'a todos los argentinos [The President Called
for 'Unity, Organization and solidarity' to all the Argentineans], CASA ROSADA (July 9, 2012),
http://www.casarosada.gov.arlinformacion/actividad-oficial/25972-cristina-fenandez-pidio-unidad-organizaciony-solidaridad-a-todos-los-argentinos.
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liberal individualist free market capitalism. 37 Even this option is of little effect.
Peronism is adapted to the pre-globalization world of autarchic national economies
and is thereby involuted: no matter how much justice it may seek regarding the
cancellation of usurious International Monetary Fund (IMF) debts38 and labor
organization,39 an involuted return to a pre-war world of isolated national
economies and protectionism cannot meet the challenges or seize the opportunities
of globalization. One may compare the economic performance of free-trading Chile
with protectionist Argentina to see which policy mix is better: advantage--Chile.
Although the Russian Federation-to present-has not brought a better, or
even any, alternative Resolution to the U.N. Security Council, the Russian
Federation has obstructed Western efforts to solve the problem of Syria at the U.N.
by consistently vetoing Western efforts to invoke the Security Council in the
struggle to remove Assad from power.40 I do not expect Russian intransigence to
change, nor do I expect the Russian Federation to propose any coherent alternative
Resolution. Syria represents an inexcusable bankruptcy of Russian foreign policy.
Russia deserves better, Russia's ally Syria certainly deserves better and indeed the
world deserves better than an intransigent blind Russian foreign policy. All Russia
sees is the threat of Islamism: it does not provide or see the possibility of hope for a
better future to the Syrian people-e.g., the protection of human rights under the
rule of law leading to economic prosperity resulting in a flourishing of culture and,
finally, democracy among Russia's allies and friends. Those who love Russia and
her people have every right to be disappointed by the failure of the Russian foreign
ministry to see a way out of the problem.
2.

Strategic Goals and Constraints of the U.S. and NATO

For simplicity's sake I equate the interests of the U.S. and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). Although that is a simplification, the various NATO
countries' interests in Syria are at least roughly aligned.
First, and most obviously, the U.S. and its NATO allies are dependent on
imported petroleum products.4 1 Petroleum products are available in abundance in
countries with which the U.S. does not have the best relations, or even any relations
at all. Energy dependence is such a constraint on U.S. national security that the
37.

Cristina Kirchner: Argentina's New Eva Peron, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:31 AM),

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/argentina/8845537/Cristina-Kirchner-Argentinas-new-

Eva-Peron.html.
Economia [Economy], CASA ROSADA (2012), http://www.presidencia.gob.ar/component/content/aricle
38.
/102-obra-de-gobiemo/1162-obra-de-gobiemo-gestion-publica.
39.
Trabajo y Seguridad Social [Labor and Social Security], CASA ROSADA (2012),
http://www.presidencia.gob.ar/component/content/article/102-obra-de-gobiemo/1 251 -trabajo-y-seguridad-social-.
40.
See Rick Gladstone, Friction at the UN. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-and-chinaveto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html? r-0.
How Dependent Are We on Foreign Oil?, ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, available at
41.
http://www.eia.gov/energy in brief/foreign oildependence.cfm (last updated July 13, 2012) ("The United States
relied on net imports (imports minus exports) for about 45% of the petroleum (crude oil and petroleum products)
that we consumed in 2011.").
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U.S. is literally running its Navy using recycled vegetable oil. 4 2 The U.S. also has a
strong interest in the struggle against terrorism. Russia shares that interest, 43 though
I would prefer to see the world united by Hope rather than fear.
Ideologically, the U.S. attempts to export the ideas of human rights and even
the rule of law but has not been particularly successful in either endeavor because
of a lack of cultural and linguistic expertise, a lack of a model of effective
multilateral cooperation under international law, and a lack of a working theory for
sustainable development of the third world." The U.S. has not effectively nor
successfully deployed or extended human rights and the rule of law as policies.
Due to historical, linguistic, and cultural ignorance U.S. ideology tends to a
simplistic black-and-white all-or-nothing individualistic view that which is then
implemented incoherently due to the limitations of those perspectives. For
example, the person Assad, an individual, is not the sole source of all that ails
Syria. Removing him from power would not instantly and perfectly solve the
problems facing Syria. Financing his opponents might indeed, as the Russians
warn, result in "blowback." Yet, although U.S. foreign policy adventurism in
Hungary (1956), Cuba (Bay of Pigs), Vietnam (1975), Lebanon (1982), and most
recently in Iraq and Afghanistan has consistently failed to attain good results for
the U.S., the U.S. never really questions its simplistic good-versus-evil
individualist free market ideology or the ways that ideology tries to implement
foreign policy: it only stares incomprehensibly at the smoking ruins without asking
the hard questions. Thus, in 2013 impoverished tribal, religious maniacs have
bankrupted the world's most powerful country. States unfriendly to the U.S. would
be the last to point any of this out. U.S. efforts to propagate the rule of law and
human rights largely fail.4 5 This is partly because the type of people most likely to
be effective human rights advocates are least likely to have a very favorable
opinion of the U.S. government and vice-versa. Diplomats and military
42.
Noah Shachiman, Navy's Big Biofuel Bet: 450,000 Gallons at 4 Times the Priceof Oil, WIRED (Dec. 5,
2011, 8:51 PM), availableat http://www.wired.com/dangerroomi/2011/12/navy-biofuels/.
43.
Andrei Nesterenko, Statement by Russian MFA Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko Regarding the Largescale Terrorist Acts in Baghdad, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Oct. 26,
2009),
http://www.mid.rul/bdomp/Brp_4.nsf/arh/A642CE28FBB285A3C325765B005A9BDC?OpenDocument.
More recently, in the Syrian context, see also KOMMeHTapHRi oHuHaJIbHoro npeaCTBHTCJS MH,14PoccHn
A.K.JlyKaHICBwa B CB33H C TeppopHCTuIeCKHM aKTOM [IPOTHB BoeHHo-nOHHTHqeCKOro pyKOBOCTBa CHpHH
[Comment by Russian MFA Spokesman A.K. Lukashevicha in Connection with the Terrorist Attack Against the
Military-politicalLeadership of Syria], MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (July 18,
2012), available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/Brp_4.nsflarh/F7DOE91169A8A0BA44257A3F004F5BC9?
OpenDocument.
44.

See PAUL CAMMACK, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRD WORLD: THE DOCTRINE FOR

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1998). If I have understood him correctly, the Marxist Professor Paul Cammack argues
that the western development models are not coherent in application but are directed toward the suppression of
alternative models of development. I try not to ascribe collective motives to capitalists, not due to fear of class
analysis but because much of the logic of the capitalist class is compelled not by agreement or cooperation among
capitalists but results from their shared beliefs and goals.
45.
Christina M. Cema recognizes that an effective rule of law is needed to secure human rights. Christina
M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An InternationalLegal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 289, 295 (1994-1995) (citing Karel Vasak, La realitijuridiquedes droits de l'homme [The Legal
Reality of Human Rights], in 4 LES DIMENSIONS INTERNATIONALES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (U.N. Educational,
Scientific & Cultural Organization 1978).
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professionals tend to view human rights and the rule of law with a certain
skepticism, even cynicism. Moreover, U.S. expertise in foreign cultures, histories,
and especially languages is deficient. Even when the U.S. finds a dedicated expert
linguist, such as Ambassador McFaul, that often comes with an entire baggage of
capitalist ideology and insensitivity, which results in treating potential partners as
problems. I am hardly diplomatic, but then again, I also do not clothe myself as
such. Nonetheless, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has vigorously-and
with remarkable success-prosecuted U.S. Foreign policy, advancing human rights
consistently and coherently despite institutional and cultural limitations; she was on
her very own rainbow tour of world diplomacy.46 The U.S. Marines have a saying:
"We can be your best friends or your worst enemies and it is your choice."A
Clinton is not leaving you the choice-she wants to be friends. One can only hope
that current Secretary of State John Kerry will be as effective but that is not
realistic: to my eyes the United States has never had a better Secretary of State, the
Chief.
The U.S., like its Israeli ally, obviously wishes to prevent any acquisition of an
atomic weapon by the government of Iran.48 Similarly, it is fairly clear that the U.S.
thinks it is time for Assad to go: the U.S. goal is a regime change in Syria. 49
Thus, the U.S. and Russia are facing a zero-sum conflict. Above all, the U.S.
wants to get rid of Assad and Russia wants to maintain its base. While those two
goals can theoretically cohere, it is likely the ouster of Assad would entail a
government possibly unwilling to continue to grant Russia basing rights in Syria. I
do not regard the ouster of Russia's base as a U.S. objective.
3. Other Interested States
Other interested states are Syria itself: Assad wishes to remain in power, and
other people wish to see him ousted.o Israel, as already mentioned, wishes to see
Iran kept out of the nuclear club."' But Iran, a Syrian ally, 52 wishes to acquire
nuclear technology.5 3 Moreover, Iran is currently under a U.S. led boycott. The
46.
Bradley Klapper & Matthew Lee, Globe-Hopping Hillary Clinton Breaks Travel Record, ABC NEWS
(July 17, 2012), available at http://abenews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/jet-setting-hillary-clinton-breaks-travelrecord- 1679207 1.
47.
Marine General Jim Mattis stated in 2003 before the invasion of Iraq, "We can be your best friend, or
your
worst
enemy."
Steve
Cheney,
Editorial,
WASH.
MONTHLY
(2008),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/080 1.cheney.html.
48.
See Mary Bruce, Obama: U.S. Will do 'What we Must' to Block Iran Nukes, ABC NEWS (Sept. 25,
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/09/obama-u-s-will-do-what-it-must-to-block-iran-nukes/
49.
See Elliot Abrams, American Options in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
http://www.cfr.org/syria/american-options-syria/p26226 (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
50.
World Briefs: Assad Reasserts Wish to Remain, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE (Nov. 9, 2012),
http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/world/world-briefs-assad-reasserts-wish-to-remain-661307/.
51.
Andrea Mitchell, Israel s Netanyahu: Draw 'Clear Red Line' to Stop Iran from Getting Nuclear
Weapons, NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 27, 2012), http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/27/14126478-israclsnetanyahu-draw-clear-red-line-to-stop-iran-from-getting-nuclear-weapons?lite.
52.
Ewen MacAskill & Duncan Campbell, Iran and Syria Confront US with Defence Pact, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 16, 2005, 8:57 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feb/l7/usa.syria.
See Bruce, supra note 48.
53.
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U.S. and E.U.5 4 are currently not buying Iranian petroleum and have successfully
persuaded China and Singapore to reduce their consumption of Iranian petroleum.
B. Possible Outcomes (and likely consequences)
Mainly, there are two possible outcomes to the crisis--either Assad will be
ousted or he will somehow maintain his position. Likewise, this entails two
possibilities-either Russia will maintain their naval base at Tartus or will be
expelled therefrom. Less predictable possible entailed consequences from those
four possibilities include an Iranian oil embargo (refusal to sell), a stepped up
Iranian nuclear program (which is unlikely, as the Russians really try to inculcate
the nuclear dependence of their atomic clients), and Iranian sponsored terrorist
attacks and a higher price of petroleum. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has been arming
the rebels 57 and apparently so has Turkey.58
The outcomes, whether Assad is ousted or not, include increased likelihoods of
expensive oil, fundamentalist terrorism, and nuclearization, and this at a time when
heavy debt already weighs on the U.S. due to ten years of failed wars in Southwest
Asia and the Horn of Africa consequent to the lawless blind unilateralism of the
Bush administration. Whatever the outcome, the resolution of the Syrian crisis will
be costly for the U.S. in economic or political terms and possibly both. However,
the U.S. President5 9 cannot walk away from Syria: the U.S. is committed to a
Syrian future without Assad, and if it were to walk away U.S. foreign policy would
seem irresolute and irresponsible. So, the U.S. is constrained to a policy of ouster.

54.
Harald Wiederschein, 01-Embargogibt Vorgeschmack aufeine Zukunft ohne 01 [Oil Embargo Gives a
Foretaste of a Future Without Oil], Focus (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.focus.de/wissen/klima/tid-24849/eustaaten-beschliessen-boykott-gegen-iran-oel-embargo-gibt-vorgeschmack-auf-eine-zukunft-ohneoel aid 705777.html.
55.
"Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the exemptions for China and Singapore on
Washington's embargos on Iran crude, citing their 'significantly' reduced oil purchases from the .Islamic
Republic." US Exempts China, Singapore from Iran Oil Embargo, PRESSTV (June 29, 2012),
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/29/248512/us-spares-china-singapore-on-iran-oil/.
56.
On the legality of a past Arab oil embargo, see Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, DestinationEmbargo ofArab Oil:
Its Legality under InternationalLaw, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1974).
57.
Diplomat Says Saudis are Arming Syrian Rebels, JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 17, 2012, 6:22 PM),
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=262224.
58.
Justin Vela, Arab States Arm Rebels as UN Talks of Syrian Civil War, THE INDEPENDENT (June 13,
2012), availableat http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/exclusive-arab-states-arm-rebels-as-untalks-of-syrian-civil-war-7845026.html; see also Michael Weiss, Syrian Rebels Say Turkey is Arming and Training
Them, THE TELEGRAPH (May 22, 2012), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/michaelweiss/100159613/syrian-rebelssay-turkey-is-arming-and-training-them/.
59.
Hereto I should note, the President's foreign policy powers are plenary and absolute. The President's
foreign policy, especially his war powers, shall not be controlled by courts or congress because of the separation of
powers and the need for the United States to speak with one voice internationally. The foreign policy power is of
necessity authoritarian, absolute and unreviewable. It is the power of war and peace and thus of life and death. It is
a terrible power but can only be restricted by refusing to fund the executive, the power of the purse. Thus, for
example, President Obama deployed U.S. military forces to Libya without receiving congressional authorization
under the 1973 War Powers Resolution. See Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing
15,
2011),
available
at
Libya
Operation,
N.Y
TIMES
(June
U.S.
Role
in
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.html (stating that the U.S. President's action was
rightful, for the war powers resolution(not act!) is non-binding and not unconstitutional as any other resolution).
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Syria is however an Iranian ally. The United States maintains no diplomatic
relations with Iran and is opposed to the Iranian government and the nuclear power
program of Iran. The U.S. policies in Syria are likely extensions of U.S. policies
toward Iran. It seems that the U.S. is shadow-boxing over Syria as a part of its
struggle against Iran.
Although U.S. foreign policy is constrained and has little to gain from regime
change in Syria, Russia is in a can't-lose position. Even if there was a civil war in
Syria and Russia was then expelled from its base, that outcome would lead to
higher petroleum costs, which would redound to Russia's benefit: Russia exports
petroleum. The worst-case scenario for Russia is still really good. The best case for
Russia is even better: maintain its base, succeed at resisting U.S. unilateralism, and
construct an alternative to U.S. hegemony. However, constructing an alternative
ideology is not likely to be the goal or desire of Russia. Russia and Putin are likely
not looking at Syria as a strategic case of elaborating a united front of the
industrializing world against imperialist finance capital. If my estimate is correct,
then Russian moves can be processed as pragmatic tactics intended to maximize
the Russian economy: Russia wishes to keep the costs of oil high, and the Western
embargo of Iran does that and also compels Iran to trade with Russia, one of Iran's
few trading partners, on terms favorable to Russia. Whatever the outcome in Syria,
Russia wins-whether through the sales of weapons and nuclear technology to the
Middle East or via the sale of oil to the West at very high prices, and possibly both.
However, those are not strategic efforts to forge a third-world united front against
U.S. global hegemony.
Russia is in a can't-lose situation but is also in a position where outcomes can
be constrained to predictability, presuming that Putin has not yet developed a
coherent third-world/periphery-BRIC ideology of alternative development. Few
people could develop such an ideology. This author is one such person, but I do not
think such is desirable given current U.S. views that are favorable toward the
triumvirate of rule of law, human rights, and multi-lateralism. If I thought Peronism
and/or neo-communism would get us out of third world wars more rapidly I would
push them. That is currently not the case in my estimate, and I think liberal
capitalism can actually work through the process of history.
Then again, what if the ghost of Eva Peron whispers quietly into Putin's ear at
night? Putin is very intelligent and is entirely capable of understanding and
implementing an alternative ideology to U.S. styled individualism and free-market
democracy. He might be clever enough to craft one. If Peron's shade talks to Putin
during the long wintery nights of Russia, let us just hope she is saying something
beautiful about law and justice-the topic to which we now turn.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW

The hard and painful question for international lawyers (jurists) is whether, and
to what extent, international law could help structure and avert the needless human
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suffering in Syria. Russia has repeatedly vetoed U.N. Security Council
Resolutions60 and has had every opportunity to suggest alternative resolutions. It
has not, despite having had plenty of time and opportunity to do so. Thereby Russia
has given up the initiative. Russian allies and potential Russian allies should note
Russia's inability to manage Syria's downward spiral, let alone avert it-to say
nothing of concluding it favorably due to intransigence and blindness. Russia had
no goal or plans for the U.N. to help build a better future for Syrians. Russia lost
the strategic initiative in abandoning its pretence of championing the world's poor;
it lost the tactical initiative in Syria due to its inability to propose a U.N. Security
Council Resolution which would solve the problem. Economic and political
pressure from the U.S. and its allies may help to convince the Russian Federation
to take responsible action to protect Russia's immediate and long term interests. As
well as the stick of sanctions there is the carrot of rewards. Politics of suasion must
attract compliance by showing the noncompliant why compliance would be in their
own best interests. A win-win solution in Syria is possible: it requires hope for
change, pragmatic optimism, hard work, and give-and-take negotiations. That is
politics-the art of the possible. Russia has not provided any of that to present. The
loss of strategic and even tactical initiative explains why the Syrian crisis is local,
not global.
This section examines the legal, not the political,solutions to the problem. The
transformation of international law and the concept of sovereignty 6 in the post-war
era have been consistently marked by juridification: the creation of international
courts and court-like bodies for the adjudication of rights to replace negative sum
political conflict with zero sum legal resolution, aiming toward the formation of
positive sum economic solutions. 62 As well as creating individual human rights,
some of which are directly enforceable, the post-war world formed an integrated
global liberal econohic order based on the free movement of goods through the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) then its successor the WTO. The
free movement of goods, capital, enterprises, and of workers-migration rights are
global norms in the post war world. These four freedoms arose to build prosperity
through interdependence and thereby avert war and the negative effects of wardeath, wasted wealth, and lost productive potential.
Which international laws are relevant to the Syrian struggle?
Even though most of international law is black-letter lex lata and unambiguous,
some parts of international law are unclear. One source of international legal
uncertainty is the fact that public international law features some contradictory
legal principles. Furthermore, some international law principles do not always
accurately reflect reality. These facts fuel erroneous critiques of international law63
60.
See Gladstone,supra note 40.
61.
MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, VOLKERRECHT § 28(3), at 197 (Beck 7th ed. 2008).
62.
Lars Blichner & Anders Molander, What is Juridification?, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES (Mar.
2005),
https://www.sv.uio.no/arenalenglish/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/workingpapers2005/wpO5_ 14.pdf.
63.
The best antinomian critique of international law I have seen so far is JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (Oxford U. Press 2005). While I don't agree with their view of
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as somehow "not really law"64 when in fact states invoke their self-help remedies
in logical methods following basic rules.
A. Contradictory Principles Disconnected from Reality: International
Antinomies
At times, international law appears self-contradictory, ambiguous and/or out of
touch with reality. These problematic points of international law are most evident
in the most conflicted and agonistic fields, namely, the rights in the law of warjus in bello andjus ad bellum.
One example of the apparent ambiguity of international law I wish to expose
and extirpate here is this: for any given internationally recognized general principle
of law 6 7 we can often find a contradicting, or at least apparently contradicting,
general principle of law which is also internationally recognized. We now look
briefly at apparent contradictions of international law in order to understand them.
Thereby we are able to reconcile apparent conflict into overall harmony.
1. The General Principle of Non-Intervention versus Humanitarian
Intervention
The principle of non-intervention 6 8 holds that no state will interfere in the
domestic, i.e., internal affairs, of any other state.6 However, we can qualify and
contrast that concept with its contraries: the right to humanitarian intervention70
and the concept of human rights.7 We can also point out how unrealistic the
customary international law as "illusory," their presentation of the positive law of nations so far as I have seen is
accurate.
For a good refutation of the idea that customary international law is not really positive and thus has no
64.
effect in the domestic U.S. legal order, see Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111
HARV. L. REv. 1824 (1997-1998).
MANFRED KONG & MARTIN ECKERT, REPETITORIUM ZUM VOLKERRECHT
65.

§ 11,

at 27 (1993).

"International humanitarian law, or jus in bello, is the law that governs the way in which warfare is
66.
conducted.... The jus ad helium (law on the use of force) or jus contra bellum (law on the prevention of war)
seeks to limit resort to force between States." IHL and Other Legal Regimes-lus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello,
ICRC.ORG (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-adbellum/overview-jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello.htm.
General principles of international law are a source of international law. HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG,
67.
supra note 11, §277, at 127.
68.
See KONG & ECKERT, supra note 65, § 424, at 249 (containing a brief overview of the principle of nonintervention).
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 1.C.J. 14, 1 205
69.
(June 27); EDITH OESER & WALTER POEGGEL VOLKERRECHT: GRUNDRISS 59 (1983).

lan Hurd, Is HumanitarianIntervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World, 25 ETHICS &
70.
INT'L AFF. 293, 311 (2011). "Contemporary international law can be read as either allowing or forbidding
international humanitarian intervention, and the legal uncertainty around humanitarian intervention is fundamental
and irresolvable. Contradictory and plausible interpretations about the legality of any act of intervention exist
simultaneously, and neither can be eliminated." Id. I agree that there is ambiguity, but argue that the ambiguity is
resolvable through structured coherent logic.
71.
'On ne peut en aucun cas pretendrequ'il serait 'licite'pourun Etat de massacrersapopulation sous le
pritexte que tout ce qui se passed I'intirieurdes frontijres rel&ve de ses 'affaires intirieures."' ("We cannot in
any way claim it is 'legal' for a state to massacre its population under the pretext that everything happening inside
the country is its 'internal affairs."') Anne-Cdcile Robert, Origines et vicissitudes du <<droit d'ing~rence [Origins
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principle of non-interference has become. In a world of deep international
economic integration, it is neither desirable nor possible for states to respect the
principle of non-interference. However, as we shall see, the principle of
humanitarian intervention is itself problematic7 2 because of the ambiguity as to
when it is justified.7 3
The international system has yet to complete its elaboration of functionalist
institutionS74 to develop neutral expertise for rule-making and adjudication to
replace military interactions with political, legal, and economic ones. Nor has
international law completely escaped the failed logic of autarchic isolated states
which doomed the world to wars for markets and resources. Autarchy and isolation
caused wars because the only way to expand market share or obtain access to
resources was to expand a state's territory-at the expense of other states.
Autarchic isolation is the principle from which the rules of non-intervention and
non-interference sprang forth. These rules are the incoherent and disempowering
orphans of a failed and dead idea-peace through "splendid isolation."
International law is at times deficient, but not as a result of internal contradictions.
Rather, it is because of our own failure to elaborate something better. It is
insufficient to merely complain. One must also propose a better alternative. If the
principle of non-intervention is to be replaced then whoever wishes to replace it
must propose a cogent and attractive alternative.
2.

Sovereignty and Immunity versus Human Rights

Another evident contradiction in international law is human rights versus
sovereign immunity. Today, human rights are internationally recognized.7 6
Individuals can have rights under international law. 7 7 They may even at times
directly enforce their rights themselves without intervention of the state acting on
their behalf. However, even if a given human right is recognized as existing,
inhering in the individual, and enforceable by the individual, such a right is then
confronted by the contradictory idea of sovereignty78 and its corollary immunity. 79
Sovereignty is the concept of the absolute and unlimited power of the state over the
and Vicissitudes of the 'Right to Intervene'], LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (May 2011), http://www.mondediplomatique.fr/2011/05/ROBERT/20488.
72.
For an early effort in the U.N. era to grapple with the idea of whether and when humanitarian
intervention might be lawful, see Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, Customary International Law Doctrine of
HumanitarianIntervention: Its Current Validity under the UN. Charter,4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1973-1974).
73.
HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supranote 11, §451, at 218.
74.
See, e.g., Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and InternationalLaw, 34 AM. J. INT'L L.
260 (1940) (describing functionalism).
75.
For a synopsis, see KONG & ECKERT, supra note 68, §295, at 184; id. § 297, at 186.
76.
This was even true during the Cold War. See OESER & POEGGEL, supra note 69, at 102-05.
77.
See, e.g., KONG & ECKERT, supranote 65, §293, at 183.
78.
J. Shen argues that the principle of sovereignty and of non-intervention are non-derogable as jus
cogens. Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principleand HumanitarianInterventionsunder InternationalLaw,
7 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 1, 29 (2001). That view is illogical and wrong as a matter of positive international law. If
sovereignty were non-derogable then there would be no otherjus cogens.
79.
HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 37(1), at 253.
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lives and property80 of its subjects and all on its territory.8 ' Modem apologists

argue that sovereignty entails responsibility8 2 but that is not the case historically;
just the opposite in fact. Sovereignty-the absolute final and unreviewable
authority of the state over the lives and property of all its subjects and all things or
persons on its territory-entails a concept of the immunity -of the state itself
(sovereign immunity for acto jure imperii) and also the immunity of the head of
state (head of state immunity) 83 and his or her ministers (ministerial and diplomatic
immunity).84 These contradictions can be resolved best by seeing sovereignty and
immunity as general rules with the existence and enforceability of human rights as
exceptions.
3. National Self-Determination versus Sovereignty and State
Integrity
The principle of national self-determination8 has been recognized by
international law since the 1970s at the very latest. National self-determination
arguably entails a corollary, the right to democracy,8 6 an uncertain right-which if
it exists, only currently exists as de lege ferenda.87 It also implies the legal
88
personality of peoples. However, the rule that a people have a right to national
self-determination is ambiguous: what is a people, and over which territoryso may
the people exercise its right to national self-determination? 91 Moreover, the
principle of national self-determination at times clashes with the international rules

See, e.g., KONG & ECKERT, supranote 65, §44, at 49.
80.
See, e.g., HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supranote i1, §394, at 174.
81.
Id. §384, at 165.
82.
Herdegen, supra note 61, §37(10), at 261.
83.
Id. §37(3), at 254.
84.
The purposes of the U.N. are: "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
85.
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen
universal peace . . . ." U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. Article I of the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations provides: "Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to
in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and
freedom and independence." G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 50(2), at 350 (noting democratic trend as reflected in treaty law, right to
86.
democracy not yet however a part of customary international law).
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 459 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "de lege ferenda," a latin phrase meaning
87.
"from law to be passed" as "a proposed principle that might be applied to a given situation instead or in the
absence of a legal principle that is in force"). De lege ferenda literally means "the law in the making", i.e. the law
which is coming into force rather than the law which is definitively existing positively speaking. Id.
88.
OESER & POEGGEL, supranote 69, at 50.
Id. at 57, 97.
89.
See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in InternationalLaw: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities90.
Islamabad(West Pakistan)and Dacca (EastPakistan), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321, 321-36 (1972).
For a discussion of the "colonial"/"non-colonial" split in this law, see Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking
91.
Self-Determination:A CriticalAnalysis of Current InternationalLaw Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
21, 29-30 (1992).
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that states are sovereign, enjoy plenary powers, and that the integrity 92 of each state
and its borders shall be respected.93
4. The Prohibition of the Use of Force versus Self Defense
These are not the only examples of conflicting, even contradictory,
international laws. For example, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 94 prohibits the use
of force (as did the earlier Kellogg-Briand Pact), 95 and Article 2(3) mandates the
peaceful resolution of disputes.96 Yet, states still enjoy the right to use force in self
defense 97 where such is strictly necessary9 8 and proportionally used. 99 The right to
use force in self defense is expressly provided for in the U.N. Charter.'00 The state
may justifiably use force to protect essential state functions and the lives of the
state's subjects (humanitarian rescue).' 0 ' The general prohibition of the use of force
admits specific exceptions' 02 and there is at least some ambiguity as to whether
certain uses of force are permitted. How much violence is needed to be considered
an armed attack which entails the justified and proportional use of force in self
defense' 0 3 will simply depend on the actual facts'0 and on the actor,'0 o which will
generally be hotly disputed.

92.
HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 33(3), at 219.
93.
See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
94.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter provides: "All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2.
95.
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343 (treaty between the United States and
other Powers providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy); see also G.A. Res. 3314
(XXIX), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
96.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3 (stating that members shall settle their disputes by "peaceful means").
97.
The use of force must be strictly necessary (no alternative) and proportional (no greater than that
needed for self-preservation). Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J.
226,1141 (July 8).
The threatened use of force may be defended against, but such threat must be "instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." Letter from the Honorable Daniel Webster, Department of
State, to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edull9th century/br-1842d.asp#web2.
98.
D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1958).
99.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 97; see also Judith Gail Gardam,
Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 391-413 (1993), available at
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2203645?uid=3739600&uid=2&uid-4&uid=3739256&sid=211016573612
5; see generally HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note I1, §422, at 195.
100.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
101.
Clearly a case where the State acquiesces, and also clearly a case prior to the U.N. Charter. There is
however doubt as to whether such is good law in the post-Charter era because of the prohibition of the use of
force. KONG & ECKERT, supranote 68, § 425, at 294-50.
102.
HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 33(3), at 220.
103.
Military and Paramility Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1J103,
195 (June 27) (noting that there is a right to self defense consequent to an "armed attack").
104.
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 1 77 (Nov. 6) ("[T]he court cannot
assess in isolation the proportionality of that action to the attack to which it was said to be a response; it cannot
close its eyes to the scale of the whole operation .... ).
105.
See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity ofPreemption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209 (2003) (arguing
that imminent attack is not a necessary prerequisite to preemptive attack against a non-state actor). I disagree with
Sofaer.
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5. Jurisdiction Based on Territoriality versus Jurisdiction Based on
Nationality
Yet another contradiction of international law is the concept of exclusive
jurisdiction and the expression of jurisdiction as arising principally out of territorial
connectionl 0 6-the territorial principle' 07 -or on the basis of the nationality of the
plaintiff or defendant' 0 8-the nationality principle.' 0 9 Since states may assert
jurisdiction on the basis of territory" 0 or nationality and because people travel,
conflicts of law are inevitably built into the international system.
6. Rights with No Remedies
As a general rule, international law does not create rights or duties inhering in
individuals."' Where it does, it does so exceptionally. Even where an individual
right or duty is recognized as existing, there may be no method for the direct legal
enforcement of the right by the individual.1 2 Historically, enforcement of
international law was a political question, not a legal one. International law would
be enforced at the sovereign prerogative of the aggrieved state, whether by friendly
or unfriendly means."13 Thus, the availability of directly enforceable individual
remedies under public international law has to be seen as exceptional because of
the split between public law and private right. The idea that one may have a right
without a legal remedy fuels the wrong-headed idea that international law is
somehow lacking positivity. It makes international law seem out of touch with
reality. This split between right and remedy is strange to eyes accustomed to
looking at national law where the existence of vested legal rights entails directly
enforceable legal remedies; this split is one of the unfortunate consequences of the
dualist world view. The sense that international law and international reality are
somehow disconnected can be rectified by understanding the relationship between
individual (generally human) rights and international law by way of general rules
(pre-war) with specific exceptions (post-war) and also by seeing rights in terms of
the public law/private law and national law/international law splits.

106.
107.

See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
HERDEGEN, supranote 61, §26(4), at 183.

108.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 421

(1987).

109.
HERDEGEN, supranote 61, §26(9), at 185.
S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 18; HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supranote 11, § 385, at 167.
110.
OESER & POEGGEL, supra note 69, at 51-52 (individual rights incompatible with coordination view of
111.
international law); KONG & ECKERT, supra note 68, § 39, at 46; HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG,supra note 11, § 116,
at 69; see also id. § 1041, at 496; HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 7(5), at 65; see also id. § 12, at 100-02.
112.
E.g., abduction is generally seen as a violation of international law, but the remedy is in the hands of
the state whose citizen or subject was abducted, not the individual person. Attorney Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5
(1962) (Isr.).
Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A BalancedApproach to Multinational Corporations,
113.
39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 526 (2001); ROLAND PORTMANN, LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 280 (2010).
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7. Sovereign Equality versus Reality
The existence of rights with no remedy is not the only example of an area
where international law seems out of touch with reality. The principle of sovereign
equality," 4 that all states have equal worth among other states," 5 is contradicted by
the realities of economics and demographics. Even well governed and prosperous
city-states like Singapore (a megalopolis, in fact) are relatively powerless in
comparison with vast continental countries like the U.S., Russia, and China. This
has ever been the lament of international lawyers-the large states do what they
can while the small states do what they must." 6
8. Massacres as Crimes Against Humanity
Most of this article is about how the U.S. and Russia can work out their
differences despite ambiguous international law, so as to prevent as much death
and maiming as possible. I have maintained that most international law governs
economic rather than military interactions and is clear and unambiguous. However,
even in the field of the law of armed conflict, there are international laws which are
clear and unambiguous. There really is no question that the government of Syria
has systematically violated the most basic right-the right to life. Mass killing,1
especially of unarmed persons and most especially of prisoners, is a crime against
humanity.118 Likewise, torture is also universally prohibited. War crimes," 9 crimes
against humanity, and torture 20 are non-derogable international customary
laws 2-luS cogens 22-and violators are consequently subject to universal

114.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1; see generally HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 28(1), at 197. For the opposition
of sovereign equality and war, see Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and
Preemptive War: The Vitality ofSovereign Equality Today, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 147-67 (2004).
115.
See generally Hans Kelsen, The Principleof Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International
Organization,53 YALE L.J. 207, 207-20 (1994).
116.
"[R]ight, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they
can and the weak suffer what they must." THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR bk. V, at 89-91

(Richard Crawley trans., The Temple Press 1914) (c. 431 B.C.).
117.
Sdvane Garibian, Crime Against Humanity, ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASS VIOLENCE (June 19,
2008), http://www.massviolence.org/IMGlarticlePDF/Crime-against-Humanity.pdf.
118.
Richard Vernon, What is Crime against Humanity?, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 231, 231-49 (2002); Egon
Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 179-80 (1946) (noting that most crimes against
humanity are also war crimes).
119.
War crimes today probably include rape, certainly when such is a systematic practice intended to
degrade, subjugate, and destroy an entire people. Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Rape as a Crime under
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 87 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 424, 424-28 (1993).
120.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, G.A. Res. 217 (1ll) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(Ill) (Dec.
10, 1948); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, European
Convention
on
Human
Rights,
Mar.
9,
1953,
C.E.T.S.
No.
5,
available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC 3-4318-B4575C9014916D7A/O/CONVENTIONENGWEB.pdf_(last amended by Protocol No. 14, C.E.T.S. No. 194, June 10,
2010); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113-14.
121.
For an overview ofjus cogens, see KONG & ECKERT, supranote 65, § 20, at 33.
122.
HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 16(14), at 139-40.
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jurisdiction. 123 It is evident that these are massive crimes under international law,
and that those crimes and torts, when finally vindicated, will entail liabilityl 2 4
such as under the Alien Tort Statute.1 2 5
9. The Rights Orchestra
Despite contradictory general principles of international law, this author argues
that we in fact live within "an anarchical society" of States1 26 and states subject
themselves and each other to law. It is not the law of the jungle. This is a game
with rules-andeveryone knows what the rules are. Now that you know what the
rules are, let us see if we can make them work.
B. Resolving Antinomies
The above mentioned contradictory principles of international law are
antinomies. Antinomies are contradictory principles, each of which purports to be
true yet which are mutually irreconcilable.1 27 Willard Quine argued that we can
divide paradoxes into three categories: 1) those which are veridical-they are
shocking, yet true; 2) those which are falsidical-they are false and misleading;
and 3) antinomies-they are self-contradicting.12 8 To pacifist Christians, the
existence of antinomy demonstrates the failure of law, and the resolution of the
human dilemma is impossible in human terms, entailing faith in God as the only
alternative to the failure of reason.129
I take a more worldly view of antinomy: I have to face the world as it is, even
as I yearn for a better world, and know that a better world is possible. I think that
most of the apparent antinomies can be resolved, and I am certain that our task as
jurists is to present well-argued rules which attract compliance through their
suasive power.
Why do people obey law? One reason is force and fear. Another more effective
one is hope and desire. Well considered laws, laws that work justice, attract
compliance and are replicated by those not subject to them. That is, we can, and
morally we must, structure the law so as to attain justice and the true peace-not
the peace of the grave.
123.

For a theoretical overview see David Luban, A Theory of Crimes against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT'L

L.85, 86 (2004).
124.

On individual liability, see, e.g., HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supranote I1, at 115.
125.
Historically, political crimes were not subject to extradition. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Crimes against
Humanity and the Principleof Nonextradition of PoliticalOffenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927 (1964). That defense
no longer exists. It is a casualty of terrorism. The rule against political extradition has since been replaced by the
idea of universal liability for violations ofjus cogens and also by the norm aut dedere autjudicare-extraditeor
prosecute.
126.

See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (Columbia

University Press 1977).
127.

W. V. QUINE, THE WAYS OF PARADOX AND OTHER ESSAYS (Random House, Inc. 1966).

128.
See id.
129.
For a more conventional view of antinomy in law, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Three Antinomies of
Modern Legal Positivism and Their Resolution in ChristianLegal Thought, 18 REGENT U.L. REv. 53 (2005).
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The reason antinomies in international law are so problematic, and in fact
dangerous to peace and human well-being, is that they allow states to justifiably
take any position they please and to argue, and not merely pretextually, that their
position is permitted, even compelled, by laws we all agreed to.
For example, Russia can justifiably argue that the principles of nonintervention' 30 and sovereign equality"' indicate that no state has any right to tell
the Syrian government or people who to keep or remove from power. Incidentally,
as a matter of positive law, Russia probably has the better position here, at least
going by lex lata.
While Russia has a good argument, so do the Syrian rebels. As a matter of the
natural law of self-preservation, the natural right to self defense,' 3 2 and also as a
matter of the positive international right to national self-determination, the people
of Syria have a right to rebel against their own government when that government
has become destructive of their very lives, where no alternative exists to arms.
Dura lex, sed lex-the law of the jungle.
As a matter of positive law, the United States has the least defensible position
but it is not an entirely indefensible position. The United States wishes to oust
Assad from power, arguing he has become destructive to the lives of his own
people. Assad has used force disproportionally and in violation of basic human
rights, thus he must go. The United States, already having undertaken humanitarian
relief,'33 will almost certainly move more toward humanitarian intervention. Under
pre-war international law, states had as a part of their untrammeled despotic
sovereign rights the right to use violence,134 afortiori where such was designed to
prevent or extinguish human rights tragedies. For example, France intervened in
Syria on humanitarian grounds as early as the 1800s. Russia also intervened for
humanitarian reasons in the Middle East as early as the 19th century. U.N. Charter
Article 2(4) changed that. Since 1945 the use of force internationally requires
approval by the U.N. Security council except in cases of immediate self defense.
What is an international lawyer to do in the face of Cerberus, the three-headed
dog of hell (hatred, fear, poverty)?' 3 1 While it is all too easy to criticize Russia for
coddling a brutal tyrant and for tolerating, or even encouraging, human rights
abuses, Russia is in fact not doing anything other than asserting the recognized
rights to non-interference in domestic affairs and to national self-determination.' 36
130.
HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 11, §§ 470-71, at 231-32.
131.
Even in the Soviet era this was the case. OESER & POEGGEL, supra note 69, at 53.
132.
See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C. B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651). For a
contemporary view, see HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 11, § 428, at 199.
133.
Press Release, Maria Otero Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;
Kelly Clements, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; and
Mark Bartolini, Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Those
Affected
by
the
Conflict
in
Syria
(July
19,
2012),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2012/07/195276.htm.
134.
OESER & POEGGEL, supra note 69, at 196.
135.
See VIRGIL, THE AENEID OF VIRGIL 144 (Allen Mandelbaum trans., Bantam Books 2004) (c. 19
B.C.E.); see also HOMER, THE ILIAD (Anthony Verity trans., OUP Oxford 2012).
136.
See, e.g., James Mayall, Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the 'New World Order', 67 INT'L
AFF. 421, 421-29 (1991), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621944.
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The political solution to this legal impasse is simply to ask Russia to propose a
resolution before the U.N. Security Council, which would be acceptable to the
Russian Federation. However, Russia has consistently proven itself unable to
shoulder the responsibility of shaping a solution, to form a constructive workable
resolution, their own action has brought this moral duty-and opportunity-to their
own foreign ministry. It seems however that the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov (the Russian homologue to Secretary of State) does not have a solution or a
resolution. And so, without vision or power, Russia evacuates Russians from Syria,
while Syrians die due to Russian intransigence coupled with an absence of a
Russian resolution as an alternative.
Back to the law: I regard the apparent contradictions in international law as
reconcilable. I would like to suggest ways to do so. Antinomies fuel the flawed and
dangerous arguments that international law somehow is not law. Antinomies lead
to avoidable conflicts-conflicts which cost lives and fortunes. Understanding and
resolving the antinomies is crucial to building peace through the rule of law.
1. The Positivity of International Law
Sometimes, seeing antinomies and lacunae, ill-informed people argue that
international law is not in fact law at all. However, that is not the case. Antinomies
and lacunae also exist in national law. We can think of the idea of judicial review,
which essentially holds that a given law is illegal; the principles of judicial review
and of parliamentary supremacy are contradictory, even antinomious. The idea that
the parliament has plenary powers, yet can somehow limit itself, is even more
clearly illogical; it is an antinomy (we have full powers: therefore we can limit our
power). Likewise, lacunae exist in national law. The legislator cannot foresee
everything, and legislative will is sometimes unambiguous. Similarly, violations of
national law occur all the time. However, no one seriously suggests that the
existence of criminals implies the non-existence of national criminal law. It is a
dangerously naive and foolish position to think international law has no
positivity-to think that way prevents the formation of the rule of law and the
attainment thereby of peace and prosperity.m' The idea that international law is no
law at all is a destructive, yet self-fulfilling prophecy. While I cannot prove the
existence of God, I can certainly prove the existence of war-and of peaceful
regular international commerce. So while there clearly are illegalities, gaps, and
apparent contradictions in international law, it is the only earthly law we have, and
it is so much better than no law at all, as any war veteran can attest. If the law as it
is does not work justice then our job as jurists is to create better laws. I propose to
do so through efforts to resolve the various antinomies described above. We can
resolve the antinomies with structured and logical thoughts based on materialism.

137.
Christina M. Cerna argues that good governance, i.e., rule of law and human rights, are necessary for
business. Cerna, supranote 45, at 295.
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Pre-war versus Post-war International Law

I argue that the main cause of the antinomies described is the result of a radical
transformation of international law that resulted from two world wars.
In the pre-war era, states had an absolute and unlimited right to use force.138
That is no longer the case. States now may only use force in self defense. 39
Likewise, in the pre-war era individuals had no directly enforceable human rights
or duties under international law.140 That is also no longer the case. Individuals
now enjoy rights and duties under international human rights law. These rights may
even, at times, be directly enforced by individuals as a matter of law, and not
merely indirectly enforced by the citizens' aggrieved state using the political
remedies of international law, which are potentially violent countermeasures such
as retorsions and reprisals.141
The pre-war era states were autarchic and isolated. There was an essential unity
of the territory of the state and the market. Thus, any state could only expand its
market or obtain access to raw materials by war. This system of autarchic and
isolated nation states enjoying an absolute right to make war doomed the world to
at least two global wars (not counting Napoleon or the entire 17th century).
Fortunately for us, that system failed so catastrophically that it has been replaced.
Rather than an impoverished world of autarchy we live in a world of
interdependence and resultant prosperity. In 2008, global recession (in some places
a depression) did not unleash a general global war among the first world countries,
unlike 1929. The problem we face today: Can we extinguish the local wars in the
third world-before they extinguish us? That is why we must focus on situations
like Syria.
Unlike the isolated and autarchic states of the pre-war international system,
states today are intensely networked and interdependent. The global norms of the
free movement of goods, capital, enterprises, and even workers create
interdependence and prosperity through trade, both of which in turn prevent and
obviate war. For example, although Russia and the U.S. have very little bilateral
trade or investment, Russia and the E.U. are intensive trading partners.142 Russia
provides the bulk of E.U. petrol products and the E.U. is Russia's largest trading
partner.14 3 The Russian Federation thus wants to maintain good relations at least
with Europe, even though it has little to lose from bad relations with the U.S.
China, in contrast, invests heavily in the U.S. and has massive export trade with the

138.
139.
140.

OESER & POEGGEL, supranote 69, at 196.
See, e.g., HERDEGEN, supranote 61, § 4(8), at 36.
John King Gamble et al., Human Rights Treaties: A Suggested Typology, A HistoricalPerspective, 7

BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 33, 39 (2001).

141.
East and West German views on international law regarded violent reprisals as illegal breaches of the
principle of peaceful resolution of disputes. OESER & POEGGEL, supra note 69, at 35; HERDEGEN, supra note 61, §
59(4), at 397; KONG & ECKERT, supra note 65, § 396, at 236.
142.
Russia Trade Picture,supra note 32.
143.
Id.
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U.S. 1" Despite its formal status as a people's dictatorship, it is more constrained in
practice with respect to the U.S. than the ostensibly democratic Russian Federation.
So, the puzzle we all face is how to extend the rule of law and the protection of
human rights into the third world in order to build trade, create interdependence,
and create prosperity to prevent and obviate war; democracy will follow inevitably
from law and prosperity. If some variant of Peronism or neo-communism would
work to build global peace through prosperity, I would push that. However,
Peronism is adapted to the idea of an autarchic national economy. Meanwhile,
Marxist ideologies never understood, and thus never implemented, the idea of
peace-through-trade. If market economies, fundamental rights, and the rule of law
are the norms then liberalism must develop an effective theory of economic
development and legal transformation of BRIC type countries into rule of law
states with strong protection of basic human rights.
3. The Rule-Exception Principle
The best way to comprehend the apparent contradictions in international law
highlighted here is to understand antinomies within international law using the
rule-exception principle. We see general rules with specific exceptions in law all
the time. Our point of departure is, and should be, the essentially dualist pre-war
rules of international law that are the general rules. The essentially monist post-war
rules are specific exceptions to those pre-war general rules. The rule-exception
principle is augmented in its capacity to describe the rule of law by the fact that the
burden of proof is on whoever wishes to argue for an exception to the general rule.
In this way, what appears at first glance to be a confused mess of contradictory
and/or unrealistic rules becomes structured and coherent. Antinomies may also be
resolved, as indicated above, by noting the structure and source of law and the
interrelation between national and international law. As to international lacunaegaps in the coverage of international law-they simply imply the need for treaties.
Anyone who is dissatisfied with a legal regime is always free to try to draft a model
convention, whether in the framework of an NGO (Non-Government Organization)
such as the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) or
via his or her own government. If you do not like the apparatus, build your own.
4. Monism and Dualism
Antinomies in international law may also result from the dichotomy of monism
versus dualism. 145 Recall that monists argue that the national and international legal
orders form a seamless whole-that there is one global legal order. 146 Hans Kelsen,

144.
China, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china (last
visited Jan. 20, 2013).
See generally J. G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of InternationalLaw, 17 BRIT. Y.B.
145.
INT'L L. 66 (1936).

146.

For the basics on monism and dualism, see HERDEGEN, supranote 61,
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whom I otherwise generally disagree with, correctly took up monism. 147 Dualism,
in contrast, argues that the national and international legal orders are separate and
distinct; that each has its own sources and structure, and that they operate on
different subjects.14 8 In reality, the world has taken up a mix of monism and
dualism.14 9 For example, the common law and German law both regard customary
international law' 50 as directly effective, an integral part of domestic law, but
regard treaties as requiring a domestic enabling act."' Unlike the common law,
German law regards international law, insofar as domestically effective, as superior
to the German constitution. 15 France is a monist regime.
Treaties, like
international law generally in French law,15 4 are an integral part of French law.
Treaties are thus presumed to be self-executing and require no parliamentary
enabling act to have domestic effect. Treaty law is hierarchically superior to French
domestic law.' 55 French treaties do require ratification, however.'5 6 Meanwhile, the
common law is dualist as to treaties: they are presumed to have no direct domestic
effect and require an enabling act or specific explicit language in the treaty itself
indicating that it is intended to have direct effect in national law. 5 7 It is a general
rule that international law is presumed to apply to states only.'5 8 Exceptionally,
however, international law today-unlike the pre-war era-creates directly
enforceable rights and duties inhering to private law natural and artificial persons.
Those exceptions may be enforced before U.S. Courts if they are part of customary
international law or are the result of Senate ratified treaties intended to have direct
domestic effect, which was also the case in the pre-war system.
147.
See, e.g., Danilo Zolo & Hans Kelsen, InternationalPeace through InternationalLaw, 9 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 306 (1998).
148.
See, e.g., KONG & ECKERT, supra note 65, §215, at 139.
149.
See, e.g., KONG & ECKERT, supra note 65, § 217, at 140-41.
150.
Customary international law is defined throughout this world as those actual state practices (usages)
which states regard as legally permitted or compelled (opinio juris). See Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 38(1)(b) (annexed to the Charter of the United Nations); see, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal
Republic of Ger./Den.; Federal Republic of Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 9 (Feb. 20); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
151.
Herdegen, supra note 61, § 22(2), at 153; GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, art. 59, § 2 (Ger.) [BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY [GG] [Constitution]] [hereinafter GG].

152.
KONG & ECKERT, supra note 65, § 226, at 145; GG, supra note 151, art. 25.
153.
"Une claire option moniste parait a priori rdsulter du texte de l'article 55 de la Constitution du 4
octobre 1958, lequel declare que 'les traites ou accords rdgulijrement ratifids ou approuvis ont des leur
publication une autoritd supirieure6 celle des lois[.]"' ("A clear monist option appears to result a priori from Art.
55 of the French Constitution of October 4, 1958 which declares that 'treaties or agreements regularly ratified or
approved have on publication an authority superior to that of laws[.].') PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 404 (6th ed., Dalloz 2002) (author's translation).

154.
"le 140 alinda du Prdambulede la Constitutiondu 27 octobre 1946 auquel on sait que le Prdambule de
la Constitutionde 1958 fail un renvoi expris, proclame l'attachementde la Rdpublique aux rgles du droitpublic
international[.]" ("Line 14 of the preamble of the constitution of October 27, 1946, to which the preamble of the
constitution of 1958 makes direct reference, declares the attachment of the republic 'to the rules of public
international law'"). DUPUY, supra note 153, at 408 (author's translation).
155.
FRENCH CONST. Oct. 4, 1958, art. 55.
156.
DUPUY, supranote 153, at 404.
157.
Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
158.
Historically, international law applied exclusively to states. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). That is no longer the case.
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The sources and structure of international law vary somewhat from the
civilianist regimes from whence they sprang:15 9 there is no international civil code.
The sources and structure of international law are especially unlike common law. It
is unambiguous that the sources of international law are custom, treaty, general
principles of law,160 and legal scholarship' 6 ' (doctrine). 162 Court decisions in
international law have no binding precedential effect on later cases. Stare decisis
does not exist in international law' 63 (caveat lector: European Court of Justice
decisions and possibly also European Court of Human Rights decisions are binding
and form precedent for future courts). 64 As to their hierarchy, jus cogens are
superior to treaties, 165 which may deviate from custom, which are superior to
general principles of law; general principles serve primarily to fill gaps in the law
(lacunae).16 6 While international law does accord a constitutive character to legal
scholarship, as a source of general principles and of opiniojuris,6 7 the U.S. is quite
reluctant to admit legal scholarship as a source of international law, and indeed,
internationally, legal scholarship is the weakest source of international law.
However, by understanding the sources and structure of international law and
its relationship to national law, we can see most readily that international law
indeed has positivity; it is valid law, just like national law. In fact, most national
legal orders are at least partly monist. Strictly dualist regimes are rare, and are
usually undemocratic and impoverished. Such states usually opt for dualism to
isolate domestic law from international law; dictatorial and tyrannical regimes and
abusers of human rights usually argue for the dualist view of international law, so
as to shield their wrongful actions from legal scrutiny. This just means we must
press home the monist view all the more earnestly.
In any event, some antinomies may result from the dichotomy of "either
dualism or monism." For examples, the principles of non-interference and of no
directly enforceable rights held by private persons, are expressions of the dualist
Article 38, paragraph I of the Statute of the International Court of Justice correctly lists the sources of
159.
international law and their hierarchy.
HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 14(4), at 105.
160.
Sources of international law include .'the works of jurists, writing professedly on public
161.
law."' Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)); "[T]he works of jurists [i.e., scholars] and commentators are . . . resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added). The
court wants lex lata, not de legeferenda.
For an overview of the sources of international law, see KONG & ECKERT, supra note 65, § 17, at 31.
162.
163.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 103 cmt. b (1987) (noting the "traditional view

that there is no stare decisis in international law"); see Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J.
Acts & Does 59, available at http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/decade/decad026.htm#art59 ("The decision of
the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.").
Case C-28-30/62, Da Costa v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 31; Case C-283/81,
164.
CILFIT, 1982 E.C.R. 3415; Case C-66/80, Int'l Chemical Corp. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato,
1981 E.C.R. 1-191.
HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supranote I1, §§ 322-23, at 143.
165.
KONG & ECKERT, supra note 65, § 34, at 42.
166.
International custom consists of actual state practice (usages) and the belief that such usages are legally
167.
compelled or permitted (opinio juris). HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 11, § 230, at 111.The custom may
be recent but then must be nigh universal. Id § 257, at 120.
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view. Knowing this, we can then condition and structure the extent of such
principles, arguing that while our point of departure may be non-intervention, and
no directly enforceable rights held by the individuals, those are general rules which
admit specific exceptions. Namely, human rights are exceptions to the principle of
no directly held rights; humanitarian relief and U.N. authorized humanitarian
intervention
is an exception to the general rule of non-intervention. These
exceptions are justified to avoid injury to basic human well-being, which would
otherwise result.
5. Recursivity
The antinomies described here do not arise out of self-reference, although
recursivity may be a source of antinomies. To present a complete heuristic, I
mention recursion. The most famous scholars on the subject are Gunther Teubner,
who discusses self-reference in law under the rubric of autopoeisis-the selfdevelopment of law,' 69 and Volkmar Gessner, who similarly argues that legal
certainty is an emergent property of networked law.o70 However, the problem of
recursivity is not as central to the antinomies in the complexes of norms described
here. Even where antinomy results from dualism- where national law erects one
norm, but international law presents us a contradictory norm-the mutual
imbrication of national law and international law may allow us to structure our way
out of the apparent antinomy. This occurs by invoking the legal presumption that
national law and international law are coherent and non-contradictory17 ' and also
by relying on the burden of proof to resolve doubtful cases, as well as by recalling
the hierarchical position of a given legal source within the State's domestic legal
order. Dualism may create apparent antinomy, but mutual imbrication-selfreference in one legal order with interchange with other legal orders-may
nonetheless dispel it.
In other words, if we fail to understand how national law and international law
are respectively structured and interrelated then we also risk failure to construct the
international rule of law, whether due to believing that international law is
somehow mythical or pointless or by propounding poorly considered laws which
will attract neither respect nor compliance, let alone replication. The failure to
structure the international rule of law leads in turn to injustice and to avoidable
conflicts, including militarized conflicts. We owe the youth something better than
laziness or stupidity. Taxpayers may also prefer to avoid another decade of
168.
The U.N. has however repeatedly authorized humanitarian interventions. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992) (resolutions concerning
humanitarian intervention in Somalia); S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998) (resolutions
allowing humanitarian intervention in Kosovo).
169.
GUNTHER TEUBNER, AUTOPOlETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (1988).
170.
VOLKMAR GESSNER & Au CEM BUDAK, EMERGING LEGAL CERTAINTY: EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE
GLOBALIZATION OF LAW (1998).

171.
See generally Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 291323 (2006), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3651149.
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wasteful war spending and economic recession by using the rule of law and
diplomacy rather than the force of arms.
6. International Law as Self-Constraint
International law may be best understood as self-constraint. A real constraint
on international illegality is the fact that whatever the state permits itself to do, it
implicitly permits other states to do. Thus, states constrain themselves in hopes that
other states will be constrained or persuaded to comply with the general rule that
state proposed. This constraint is real because, as a matter of logic, whatever a state
regards as legal for itself-it must also regard as legal for other states.
For example, if the U.S. claims that it may legally assassinate, then such a
claim implies it is also legal for Russia to assassinate. Likewise, if the U.S. thinks
humanitarian intervention is legal for itself, then humanitarian intervention is also
legal for Russia. Similarly, the Israeli government sometimes argues that its
aggressions, for example, when it unilaterally and illegally17 2 bombed an Iraqi
nuclear reactor,173 are cases of legitimate self defense-anticipatory self defense.174
These arguments17' are truly foolish because the claims empower Israel's neighbors
to argue that their aggressions are anticipatory self defense. Anticipatory self
defense is illegal under international law.176 Moreover, a rule of law which would
allow anticipatory self defense resulted in a world of constant war. Indeed,
international law prior to the U.N.-the body that contributed so much to the very
creation of the Israeli state-allowed states to engage in any aggression at any time
and thus allowed anticipatory self-defense. However, the rule prior to the U.N.
resulted in war after war. As such, the proposed Israeli norm has never been taken
up by any other state, not even by Israel's close allies. It is also why the United
States should think carefully before deciding to advocate a norm of lawful
unilateral humanitarian intervention to secure the right to democracy. Certainly,
"humanitarian intervention" is more defensible than "anticipatory self defense" in a
logic of shaping a world of peace and justice through the rule of law, human rights
and democracy. However, democracy at gunpoint cannot work. Promulgation of
norms often works best through emulation. NATO member states can and should
persuade other states to adopt NATO member norms such as democracy, liberty of
expression, freedom of religion, tolerance, and charity because such values attract
compliance because they work substantive justice. Such values transcend states and
even religions, and by their very transcendence they are powerfully attractive. An
orchestra of rights, even if disciplined and constrained by reality, operates
harmonically.
HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 11, § 435, at 206-07.
173.
Id. §§ 435-36, at 207-08.
174.
To be clear, the purported right to "anticipatory self-defence[sic]" is flat out rejected by the U.N.
HERDEGEN, supranote 61, § 34(19), at 237-38.
175.
See, e.g., Beres Louis Rene, Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right ofAnticipatory Self-Defense
172.

underInternationalLaw, VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111 (1993-94).

176.

HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 11,
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C. Would U.S. or NATO Intervention in Syria Be Lawful? If So, When?
The U.S. position on Syria is that that the Syrian people have a right to
democracy and to self-determination, and that the ruler of Syria, Assad, is
systematically and brutally repressing the Syrian people in violation of the most
basic human right-the right to life; and that this in turn entails some right to
overthrow Assad's regime to which the U.S. can legally contribute to, somehow.
The U.S. approach is nothing more than the neo-conservative "regime change"
theory-this time represented by the U.S. left, rather than the right. If it were not
facing a vacuum of ideas on the part of Russia or China (PRC) then it would be
indefensible interventionism. But in the face of blind intransigence and grave
human rights violations, in the absence of any vision or alternative presented by
Russia or the PRC, the United States and its NATO allies are justified to propose
alternatives which otherwise might be questionable. The U.S. position has moral
force, and claims to fulfill the U.S. duty to respect and protectl77 human rights, (an
international rule which in my view is yet in formation, i.e. de lege ferenda, more
political than legal); 17 8 is there any legal basis for this chain of claims expressly or
implicitly made by the U.S. to contribute to regime change in Syria?
1. The Right to Democracy
Our first question must be whether there is a right to democracy under
international law; this is a more difficult question than one may think. While our
own first-world liberal democratic values of government by consent, whether
directly or via elected representatives, might lead us to naturally presume there is
an international norm of democracy that is not the case according to history.
Throughout thousands of years of human history, states have been governed by
theocrats, dictators, kings, and emperors. Democracy, even as the clear modern
trend for two centuries, is in fact an exceptional phenomenon. If we wish to decode
the keywords "American exceptionalism" in a helpful sense, I would suggest
understanding the U.S. Republic as exactly what it claims to be. The U.S. is a new
secular order-novus ordo saeclorum. It is a world-order (kosmos) of democracy
instead of royalty, a civil and not religious state, governed by a principle of consent
and freedom rather than order and constraint. However, although American
exceptionalism was exceptional, it has become less so as America's founding ideas
have increasingly found resonance elsewhere - the exception (secular democracy
and absence of constraint) has become the rule, and the rule (theocratic hierarchical
authority) has become the exception. When looking at internationallaw we have to
177.
For an argument that sovereignty is the responsibility to protect see, e.g., HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG,
supra note I1, § 384, at 166. 1 regard that as desirable but wishful thinking, at best de legeferenda and certainly
not lex lata. Note for example the principle of immunity of the state and its agents.
178.
But a political right may nevertheless at times be effective. See Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo
Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "HumanitarianIntervention", 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 826 (1999), available
at http://heinonline.org/HOLPage?public=false&handle-hein.joumals/ajil93&men hide-false&men tab-citnav
&collection=joumals&page=824 ("[It is the] responsibility of the world community to address threats to
international peace and security resulting from genocide and other crimes against humanity.").
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recognize the fact that most states have historically been governed by aristocratic
and theocratic forces, essentially expressing the Aristotelian idea of the state as the
family writ large. This implies all of the opportunities and constraints that familiar
relations require. A minority of states are still governed in such ways.
Given this history we can question whether a right to democracy exists as lex
lata, i.e., as existing positive international law. However I argue that there is a right
to democracy under international law. People are best governed when they are selfgoverning. Other scholars have recognized the emerging right to democracy.' 79 The
right to democracy is de lege ferenda and such a right would likely not be
considered as binding customary international law before a U.S. court after Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.'80 Today's theocratic dictatorships are the persistent objectors to
the rising customary law of democratic self governance. The right to democracy is
certainly not yet jus cogens but one day may be.
We can see the right to democracy in the very foundations of the international
legal system. Peoples, i.e., nations,' 8 ' constitute states.182 This is why international
law is also known as "the law of nations" (jus gentium). States are constituted by
peoples and in their mutual intercourse states in turn constitute the international
system.183 A democratic basis, of a sort, is the foundation of international law.

We may also consider the right to democracy from the perspective of other
rights, which are unambiguous.. Since at least the 1970s, there is a positively
recognized international right to national self-determination.'" Furthermore, there
is also an internationally recognized right to revolution. The right to rebel is a
consequence of the natural law right to self defense, i.e., the right to selfpreservation. The right to revolution is seen in positive law in the fact that
insurgent movements, if sufficiently organized and successful, enjoy belligerent
rights in domestic armed conflicts and can become a successor government to the
state power which they opposed. 8 5
We may also look to international treaty law for evidence of the right to
democracy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights' 86 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' 87 indicate democratic rights and principles
under international law. Likewise, U.N. Resolutions recognize democracy as a key
norm. 8 8
179.
Gregory H. Fox, The Right to PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLaw, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539,
544(1992).
180.
542 U.S. 692 (2004) (noting that alien tort claims may only invoke norms which are lex lata, not de
legeferenda).
181.
KONG & ECKERT, supranote 65, § 66, at 62-63.
182.
KONG & ECKERT, supra note 65, § 49, at 51-52. The alternative theory is that the international system
constitutes states. However, that is not logical.
183.
oESER & POEGGEL, supra note 69.
184.
Id.
185.
HERDEGEN, supra note 61, § 11(2), at 98.
186.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111)A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10,
1948).
187.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171.
188.
See G.A. Res. 50/172 11U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/172 (Dec. 22, 1995); G.A. Res. 56/154 11U.N. Doc
A/RES/56/154 (Feb. 13, 2002) (noting national sovereignty in electoral processes for protecting human rights).
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Taken together,'89 the right of a people to form a state,' 90 the right of a people
to national self-determination,' 9' the right of the governed to rebel against an unjust
government when no alternative exists to secure their own survival, in concert with
various treaty rights to democratic representation and self-expression indicate that
there is a global norm-the right to democracy. A right to democracy exists at least
de lege ferenda. Such are the birth pangs of new rules of international law. The
right to democracy is however not jus cogens because it is immediately confronted
by the fact of dictatorship. The naked declaration of the right to democracy is
immediately confronted by the reality of dictatorships around the world. However,
dozens of dictatorships in South America in the eighties and in Eastern Europe in
the nineties went out of business. More will follow. Still, a minority of
governments on earth remain governed by theocratic regimes or secular
dictatorships: they may be seen as persistent objectors to the rising customary law
principle of democratic self determination. Dictatorships still exist. We can and
should help them out of the sad black and white world of fear and poverty and into
the spectral world of hope and comfort-the brighter future that everyone wants.
That is how we extend human rights-by persuading people. If we think someone
is not respecting human rights, as we would like him to, then we must explain to
him why respecting basic rights is in his best interests. No one likes threats and
lectures. Everyone wants the good life; point out how to get it and they will go for
it.
Furthermore, in advancing the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and
the right to democracy we must be very careful of cultural blindness. While it may
shock you, a peoples' dictatorship may very well be popular. Who does not admire
a strong and effective leader who does good things? A people's dictatorship can be
considered by the governed to be well-governed and legitimate by the governed.
Likewise, an Islamic Republic may be well loved by the governed. One must not
be too quick to judge any other culture but one's own, to universalize local values,
lest we misconstrue or misunderstand others actions and intentions or make broad
brush generalizations. For example, I am personally fine with just about any family
structure. However, different cultures believe in different family forms. For
example, Muslim polygamists think they are being fair and charitable-they have
fewer divorces. Likewise, gay marriage might shock some cultures, yet in others it
is normal. Simply because a people do not enjoy self-representation the same as
others does not mean they do not enjoy self-representation.
Even if there were no international right to (western style liberal) democracy
there is certainly an internationally recognized right to rebel. Just as Russia is right
to claim there is no unilateral NATO right to attack Syria's government, even in
order to help the Syrian people, there is a right of the Syrian people to wage war
against their own government, i.e., insurgency. Whether such will redound to the
189.
See Cerna, supra note 45 (arguing that, if all people have human rights and democracy is a human right
then all people have a right to democracy).
190.
HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 11, § 115, at 68.
191.

Id.
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benefit of Islamic Jihadis is another question. Just as one must be careful of cultural
blind-spots, one must also be careful of the unintended consequences of advocating
or using violence. Violence should be our last resort, not merely for humanitarian
reasons - we are all human. We should also be hesitant to use violence because
death is irrevocable and entails emotional wounds among the survivors that never
heal, and which may one day bear the bitter fruit of vengeance or unintended
consequences. We live in the world for which we set an example.
2.

Does the Right of a People to National Self-Determination or to
Democracy Imply a Right of Other States to Intervene?

From the idea of a right to democracy, the U.S. would like to argue for some
right of other states to intervene to help an oppressed people obtain democracy.
That claim is more tenuous than the claim for a right to democracy under
international law. First of all, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter clearly outlaws the
unilateral use of force except in self defense; any military intervention requires the
approval of the Security Council of the U.N.192 However, if approved by the
Security Council, humanitarian intervention is legal.19 3
So, the right to democracy is an example of a case where a right, if it exists at
all, may have no effective means of legal enforcement. Political remedies such as
violent revolution are the only option. When people make extreme legal claims that
have a weak basis in positive law, the result is that they undermine the idea of the
efficacy of international law which, as a status quo power, is not in the interests of
the U.S. or any of its NATO allies.
3. Humanitarian Missions under International Law
Although the right to democracy under international law is tenuous, and there
is no right to unilateral humanitarian intervention under international law,' 94 that
does not mean international law cannot be plausibly invoked in the case of Syria.
First, while Russia has vetoed the U.S.'s proposed resolutions regarding Syria, that
192.
Although, with Security Council approval an intervention to secure democratic rights may well be legal
and no unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of another state. See Karsten Nowrot & Emily Schebaker, The
Use of Force to Restore Democracy: InternationalLegal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra
Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321, 378 (1998-1999), available at http://heinonline.org/HOLPage?public=
false&handle hein.joumals/amuilrl4&men hide-false&men tab-citnav&collection journals&page=321
(describing lawful pro-democracy humanitarian intervention).
193.
See U.N. Charter art. 32; U.N. Charter art. 42; Hurd, supra note 70.
194.
Cf Nowrot & Schabaker, supra note 192, at 321, 372. Author Nowrot regards the legality of unilateral
humanitarian intervention as uncertain:
Even if the international community of states once accepted a customary doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, it is not at all clear that the doctrine survived the United Nations
Charter. Given the recent United Nations authorized humanitarian interventions in Somalia,
Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, however, it is possible to conclude that humanitarian
intervention may be legally authorized by the Security Council. The legal status of
unauthorized interventions, however, is tenuous.
Id. at 372.
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simply means the U.S. and its NATO allies can, and should, put the ball in the
Russian court. Russia thinks the proposed resolutions were not even-handed since
they only proposed the possibility of sanctions against the government of Syria.
Russia ought to table a resolution that contains proposals Russia considers evenhanded and would achieve the desired goal of peace and stability in Syria.
However, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov does not have any
alternative resolution ready after a half a year of crisis. The Russian Federation has
shown itself incapable of generating or implementing any alternative to
Washington and NATO. While it might have been sensible to have given Russia
opportunities to elaborate alternatives, the Russian Federation has had plenty of
opportunities to do so and has instead only engaged in dilatory and ham-handed
political grandstanding.
The following sections shall discuss ways in which humanitarian missions can
be constructed so as to help people out of this mess.
a. Humanitarian Rescue
First, it is fairly clear that there is an actual state practice,195 constant both
before and after the U.N. Charter, which permits states to lawfully rescue their own
nationals in danger. No one credible suggested that the Israeli raid on Entebbe,
Uganda (a state which suffered self-inflicted genocide) in response to an illegal
hostage taking, was illegal. The violation of Uganda's sovereign territory was
regrettable, but necessary and justified by the higher norm of the protection of
innocent life and by the failure of Uganda to properly police its own territory.
Similarly, the French intervention at Kolweizei was also regarded as entirely legal.
If Russia were to land its naval infantry it has stationed in the Eastern
Mediterranean in order to protect its own nationals from insurgency, that would be
legal under international law a fortiori if they were invited to land by the Syrian
government. Thereto, we can note that the Russian government did not veto the
extension of the U.N. peacekeeper mission, which ended in August 2012 due to the
impasse among the members of the Security Council.19 6 I have not yet seen an
indication that the Kremlin is other than disgusted or jaded at the waste of human
life in Syria. Ending the peacekeeping mission in Syria was a mistake; it should
have been extended and included Russian forces. Both Russia and NATO would
like something other than a civil war and human rights abuse in Syria. However,
while Russia's cogent support of its ally is sensible, it is right of Russia to criticize
the west for failure to consider the aftermath of the removal of Assad. Russia is not
committed to the person Assad, rather it is committed to an orderly outcome which
will not fuel fundamentalist extremist violence. While Russia is not proposing a
better future for the Syrian people the West did not think through the aftermath of
195.
Actual state practice is one element of customary international law. See, e.g., KONG & ECKERT, supra
note 65, § 26, at 37.
196.
Monitoring a Cessation of Armed Violence in all its Forms, UNORG, http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/missions/unsmis/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
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regime change in Libya, Egypt-or Syria. So, the Russian intransigence and
blindness is only relatively to be condemned.
b. Humanitarian Relief (devoir d'inghrence)
Just as one can distinguish a few clear cases where states legally intervene with
executive power to defend the very lives of their citizens, we can also note the
fairly unquestioned practice of humanitarian relief. 197 Humanitarian relief is the
provision of non-military means such as food, medicine, and water-the nonviolent necessities required for human survival. Peacekeeping keeps belligerents
separated and is preventative. The U.S. has been undertaking humanitarian relief in
Syria with neither approval nor condemnation, neither by the U.N. nor by the
Russian Federation.19 8
Humanitarian relief in French law is known as the devoir d'ingrence-the
duty of provision of resources in the face of an ungoverned or unmanageable
situation.199 Humanitarian relief does not involve the use of force and is a form of
peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is the provision of military forces to observe, and if
possible, keep separated the conflicting factions. It is not likely that humanitarian
relief rquires U.N. Security Council authorization since it is not a use of force. It
is an intervention, but a non-violent intervention, and when justified by
necessity,200 it should be seen as lawful. It is an actual state practice, not
condemned by any state, and simply does not evoke the U.N. Charter Article 2(4).

See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. §2561 (WEST 2012) ("Humanitarian assistance").
197.
198.
U.S. HumanitarianAid Reaching Syria and Neighboring Countries, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Aug. 2,
2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/195965.htm (cooperation with UN); Press Release, U.S.
Embassy, Moscow, U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to Syria (May, 11 2012), available at
http://moscow.usembassy.gov/pr 051112.html.
Operations Paix, Lexique, "Devoir et Droit d'Ingdrence" (2012), http://www.operationspaix.net/41199.
lexique-devoir-et-droit-d-ingerence.html.
Le droit d'ing&ence est la reconnaissance du droit des Etats de violer la souverainetd
nationale d'un autre Etat, en cas de violation massive des droits de la personne. Le devoir
d'ingdrence,quant lui, est congu comme plus contraignant.11ddsigne l'obligation morale
faite a un Etat de fournir son assistance en cas d'urgence humanitaire. Ni le droit, ni le
devoir d'ing&ence n ont d'existence dans le droit humanitaire international.L'ingirence
elle-meme n'estpas un conceptjuridiquedefini. Au sens commun, il signfie intervenir, sans
y tre invitd, dans des affaires qui relvent essentiellement de la compdtence nationaled'un
Etat. (The right to intervene in an ungovernable situation [humanitarian intervention] is the
recognition of the right of states to violate the national sovereignty of another state in case
of massive violations of human rights. The duty of a state in the face of ungovernable
situation [humanitarian relief], as for it, is conceived more restrictively. It designates the
moral obligation of a state to furnish its assistance in the case of a humanitarian emergency.
Neither the right nor the duty of states in the face of an ungovernable situation [i.e. neither
humanitarian intervention nor humanitarian relief] are part of the international law of armed
conflict [i.e. international humanitarian law]. "Failed State" [1'ingdrence] itself is not a
juridically defined concept. In the usual sense it indicates intervention, without invitation,
into the affairs which refer to the essential competences of the state.)

&

Id.
200.

On necessity as a justification, see HERDEGEN, supranote 61,
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c. Humanitarian Intervention
One can, and should, distinguish humanitarian intervention (droit d'ing~rence)
from humanitarian relief.20 1 Humanitarian intervention entails the use of force to
protect a populace from a state.202 It is peace making. Peace making is the forcible
ending of hostilities. A humanitarian intervention may seek to merely separate
warring parties or may go further and seek to remove a person, persons, or entire
government.203 After the various U.N. sanctioned military and paramilitary
activities in Yugoslavia, it seems fairly clear that humanitarian intervention with
the approval of the U.N. Security Council is legal 204 at least where approved by the
U.N. Security Council.205 That is because humanitarian intervention is a use of
force and is, generally speaking, not a use of force in self defense. The use of force
in humanitarian intervention must, like the use of force generally, be necessary,
proportional, and approved by the Security Council. Additionally, the use of force
in humanitarian intervention must be not only necessary to prevent some greater
harm but also likely*to be effective thereto. 20 6 Without the approval of the U.N.
Security Council, 207 humanitarian intervention, however desirable it may be to
some,208 would be illegal 209 for otherwise there would be abuse of such right. 2 10
Thus, even if the Syrian people have a right to rebel (they do) and a right to
201.
See, e.g., Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The
Emerging Right ofHumanitarianAssistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 329, 340 (199495) (humanitarian assistance distinguished from humanitarian intervention).
202.
HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 11, § 451, at 218.
203.
Id. §456-57, at 222-23.
204.
Id. §451,at 219.
205.
Id. §454, at 220.
206.
Id. §455, at 221-22.
207.
The view from Russia likewise seems to be that the Security Council approval of humanitarian
intervention is required if such a right exists at all. See J.H. Tapacona, KjJHCKYCCHH 0 HPABOMEPHOCTH
TYMAHMTAPHOI' 'HTEPBEH4 H, 9 BOHPOCh1HBHJ1HCTIIqECKOR HA YKH I COBPEMEHHOCTb
[On the DiscourseofLegality ofHumanitarianIntervention, Nine Questions of Contemporary Civil Law Science],
Vol. 1, No. 14, BecTHHIK BonrorpaacKOTO rocynjapCreHHOro yHHBepcnTera. CepHA 5: lOpucupyeeHIHia, 99
(2011), available at http://new.volsu.ru/upload/medialibrary/178/2jbqfekwlzmdzxgct.pdf (noting that the legal
status of humanitarian intervention under international law is ambiguous, but probably does not exist without U.N.
Security Council approval).
208.
Often, U.S. authors argue, perhaps understandably, and certainly from good intentions, for a unilateral
right to humanitarian intervention to prevent gross violations of basic human rights. I think those arguments are
wrong as a matter of positive law and do not recognize the fact that enabling unilateral humanitarian intervention
for one state enables it for all states. See, e.g., Amy Eckert, The Non-Intervention Principle and International
Humanitarian Interventions, 7
INT'L
LEGAL
THEORY
49
(2001),
available at
http://heinonline.org/HLOUPage?public=false&handle=hein.journals/intt7&men hide=false&men tab-citnav&co
llection-journals&page-49 (arguing that international law permits unilateral intervention to prevent gross
violations of human rights).
209.
Henkin, supra note 178.
210.
The reason that unilateral intervention is illegal is because of the fact that otherwise spurious claims to
"humanitarian" intervention would be made any time any state wished to interfere in the internal affairs of other
weaker states. The Russian literature is reserved regarding the right to humanitarian intervention, and critical of its
potential

for abuse.

17.A.

LIblIAHKOB, Fymanusasju

anc(ynapodublx

omnouenul: npomueopevua

u

napadoKcbt I TPA)KJ(AHCKOE OBIpECTBO H HPABOBOE FOCYJAAPCTBO OMMECTBEHHbIE HAYKH
H COBPEMEHHOCTh 51, 57 (1998). The fact of human rights atrocities committed in the name of humanitarian
intervention and the problem of pretextual abuse of the idea of the right to humanitarian intervention was noted as
early as 1910. See Anton Rougier, "La thdorie de l'intervention d'humanit,"l7 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT
INT'L PUB. 468 (1910).
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democracy (maybe), those rights simply do not entail a unilateral right of the U.S.
or NATO to intervene militarily in Syria's internal affairs. It is true that the
refugees fleeing Syria make the Syrian situation an international concern, properly
subject to governance by the U.N. Security Council.2 1' It is also true that the Syrian
destruction of a Turkish aircraft and aircrew 212 by Syria entails NATO's right to
proportional reprisals.2 13 However, there is currently no legal right to intervene
militarily in Syria to oust Assad. That indicates it is all the more necessary to
prevail upon the Russian government's self interest in being seen as the force on
the right side of history. Unfortunately, to present the Russian Federation has
consistently proven to be intransigent and blind on the idea of just how to shape a
better future for the Syrian people.
d.

Summary

In my opinion, the best way forward in Syria is to reintroduce, extend, and if
possible, expand the role of the peace keeping observers' mission by establishing
refugee zones protected by NATO and, if possible, also by Russian naval infantry,
preferably pursuant to an extension of UN Security Council Resolution 2043.214
While the Russian diplomatic apparatus may move at a glacial pace, when the
vertical power system does make a decision the apparatus moves in unison and
rapidly, i.e., decisively. However, given Russia's consistent repeated failures over
the past half year to propose any solution I do not expect Russia to contribute other
than negatively to this crisis. This is unfortunate for the Russian Federation.
However, Putin's team lacks vision. Lavrov's Ministry of Foreign Relations has
not shaped a resolution which would ensure a better future for all Syrians, but has
consistently blocked efforts by the United States and its allies to do so.

211.
Thus, for example, international Refugees were seen by the U.N. Security Council as endangering
international peace in Iraq, Haiti, Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire and thus subject to the U.N. Security Council's
ambit. Nowrot & Schabaker, supranote 192, at 350-5 1.
212.
Ibrahim Kaya, What Does InternationalLaw Say About the Downing of the Turkish Jet?, TODAYS
ZAMAN (June 26, 2012), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-2847 11 -what-does-intemational-law-say-about-thedowning-of-the-turkish-jet-by-ibrahim-kaya.html.
213.
The
North
Atlantic
Treaty
art.
5,
Apr.
4,
1949,
available
at
http://www.nato.int/nato-static/assets/pdf/stockpublications/20120822-nato-treaty-enlight_2009.pdf
("[Ain
armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them
all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence [sic] recognised [sic] by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations ...
."). If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party "[fqor the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of
the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack ... on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in
or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed
. .. ." Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, art. 6(1), S.C. Res. 2043,
U.N.
Doc.
S/Res/2043
(Apr.
21,
2012),
available
at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/
viewdoc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2043%28201 2%29.
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III. CONCLUSION
This article began with a summary of the political stakes and a discussion of
the relevant laws. We conclude with the laws, which are hopeful, and then turn to
the politics, which are less than hopeful.
Some ambiguity in international law is inevitable because one of its major
sources is international custom. Customary international law is defined2 15 as actual
2 16
state practice (usages) and the belief that such usages are lawful (opinio juris).
Both usages and opinio will inevitably be somewhat uncertain. Whoever wishes to
plead a customary law must bear the burden of proof that the custom even exists, 217
which helps to resolve uncertain cases. Furthermore, the formation of new customs
under international law is always possible and may entail the violation of existing
customs. When is the violation of an existing custom illegal and when does the
illegality become sufficiently widespread that a new custom has replaced an old
one? Ambiguity and even illegality are built into customary international law.
International law is also open textured, in that the general principles of law,
often elaborated through legal scholarship, invite a chorus of voices to the
orchestra. Our task as conductors is to orchestrate the voices of jurists-voices
which while few in number represent tens or even hundreds of millions of peopleto channel that chorus of claims for justice into laws, which while few in number
are fundamental and undeniable due to the attractive power of basic justice and
clear thinking. The dead of all wars past accuse with their bones when we fail at
this. Brave people-men, women, and children who stood and fell, living and
loving and hoping for justice-are our judges. Our jury consists of those whom we
may yet save.
Although international law is open textured, it is usually unambiguous. Some
ambiguity in international law is inevitable because of customary law. Customary
international law changes over time. Nevertheless, we can structure apparently
conflicting norms by considering their sources and hierarchical priority, by rules
and exceptions, burdens of proof, and carefully understanding the connections
between national laws and international law. International law emerges from the
tears and blood of these struggles.
Our grandparents fell in global wars and our parents faced each other down in
the Cold War. Marx rightly predicted that technological progress would inevitably
make the abundance of social production available to all, creating a world of peace
and plenty with civil society replacing state and violence. Our task now is to extend
the logic of peace through prosperity and interdependence from the global core to
its periphery.

215.
216.
217.

See, e.g., HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note I1, § 233 at I11.
HERDEGEN, supranote 61, § 16(1), at 129.
HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 11, § 231, at 111.
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IV. PREDICTIONS
Poetic I may be, but politically my predictions are less sonorous. Many Syrians
have already died. Many more will likely die. Continued descent into Syrian civil
war seems likely. It is likely, but not inevitable, that U.S.-Russian relations will
worsen rather than improve. Conflict in the Islamic world will likely continue, and
these conflicts will cost cash, needlessly prolonging the global recession. More
money will likely be wasted on wars that could have been avoided. I regard Syria
as a lost opportunity to elaborate the rule of international law and to stabilize the
Islamic world. I also suspect that the Syrian situation signals the start of a U.S.Russian "cold peace" as can be seen in visa problems, expulsion of the U.S.
Agency for International Development from Russia, the Russian "foreign agent"
NGO registration requirements, and then the Magnitsky and anti-Magnitsky Acts,
as well as in existing and proposed Russian anti-gay legislation, the termination of
anti-criminal cooperation and Russian rearmament. Worst, bilateral U.S.-Russian
tension is not the result of any ideological split. It is simply due to intransigence,
inadaptability, lack of expertise and refusal to conceive of better futures than "the
long war." The U.S. and R.F. have a common interest in opposing terrorism.
However, the U.S. foreign relations Establishment and its counterpart the Russian
nomenklatura seem locked into stupid cold war logic of constant conflict. They
lack expertise and vision.
There is however one real hope. Russia and the E.U. are strong trading
partners. Interdependence fosters peace and prosperity. Global interdependence
prevented another global war after the global depression of 2008 (unlike 1929,
which led to 1939). Furthermore, I do not expect the current cold peace to break
down into the proxy wars, which characterized the cold war. I do not expect Syria
to be a proxy battlefield for the U.S. and R.F., unlike the Arab-Israeli wars of
1948-1982, the Vietnam War, the Korean War and other brush-fire wars. But coldpeace is sub-optimal. Somehow the U.S. Establishment and the nomenklatura,
must learn to cooperate despite the hard past. It is in their common interest to do
so. However, institutional habits seem to change at a glacial pace. If the cold peace
is to melt into the white nights of a Petersburg summer then it is for Europe to
bring the old rivals to a new understanding.
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